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ABSTRACT
Lawmakers in the United States and Europe are seriously considering
imposing duties of data loyalty that implement ideas from privacy law
scholarship, but critics claim such duties are unnecessary, unworkable, overly
individualistic, and indeterminately vague. This paper takes those criticisms
seriously, and its analysis of them reveals that duties of data loyalty have
surprising virtues. Loyalty, it turns out, can support collective well-being by
embracing privacy’s relational turn; it can be a powerful state of mind for
reenergizing privacy reform; it prioritizes human values rather than potentially
empty formalism; and it offers solutions that are flexible and clear rather than
vague and indeterminate. We propose five contexts in which specific rules
should supplement a general duty of data loyalty: collection, personalization,
gatekeeping, influencing, and mediation. Loyalty can be a key policy tool with
which to take on the related problems of information capitalism, platform power,
and the use of personal data to manufacture consent to objectionable data
practices. In fact, loyalty may well be the critical missing piece of the regulatory
toolkit for privacy.
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INTRODUCTION
Lawmakers in the United States and Europe are now seriously considering
imposing a duty of loyalty on companies that process human information.1 Such
1
See, e.g., Data Care Act of 2019, S. 2961, 116th Cong. § 2 (2019) (“Duty of Loyalty: An online service
provider may not use individual identifying data, or data derived from individual identifying data, in any way
that—(A) will benefit the online service provider to the detriment of an end user; and (B)(i) will result in
reasonably foreseeable and material physical or financial harm to an end user; or (ii) would be unexpected and
highly offensive to a reasonable end user.”); Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2968, 116th Cong. § 101
(2019) (“Duty of Loyalty: (a) In General.—A covered entity shall not—(1) engage in a deceptive data practice
or a harmful data practice; or (2) process or transfer covered data in a manner that violates any provision of this
Act.”); New York Privacy Act, S. 5642, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess., § 1102 (N.Y. 2019) (“Every legal entity . . .
which collects, sells or licenses personal information of consumers, shall exercise the duty of care, loyalty and
confidentiality expected of a fiduciary with respect to securing the personal data of a consumer against a privacy
risk; and shall act in the best interests of the consumer, without regard to the interests of the entity, controller or
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duties of loyalty represent both an alternative to the failed “notice and choice”
regime in the United States and a supplement to the more robust General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) model in the EU.2 Scholars have proposed duties
of loyalty—in a variety of forms, including loyalty duties for data collectors,
“information fiduciaries,” design rules, and fiduciary boilerplates—in part
because loyalty represents a substantive check on the ability of companies to use
human data to nudge, influence, coerce, and amass vast profits from the
exploitation of human information and experiences.3 Loyalty, thus, holds the
potential to be a powerful response to what Julie Cohen calls “informational
capitalism” and Shoshana Zuboff calls “surveillance capitalism”: the claiming
of “human experience as free raw material for hidden commercial practices of
extraction, prediction, and sales.”4
Yet, all is not well with the duty of loyalty, as it faces myriad critiques from
regulators, companies, and even otherwise sympathetic academics. These critics
assert that loyalty does little to deal with the structural pathologies of platform
capitalism, and that backward-looking fiduciary models would fall apart at the
massive scale at which platforms operate.5 They argue that a duty of loyalty is
unnecessary because it would do little that existing consumer protection rules,
data protection models, and duties of care do not already accomplish, and

data broker, in a manner expected by a reasonable consumer under the circumstances.”); Commission Proposal
for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Data Governance, at 18, COM
(2020) 767 final (Nov. 25, 2020); Data Protection Act 2018, c. 12, § 123(1) (Eng.); An Act to Provide Facial
Recognition Accountability and Comprehensive Enforcement, H. 117, 2021 Leg., 192d Gen. Ct. Mass., § 2(a)
(Mass. 2021) (“A covered entity shall be prohibited from taking any actions with respect to processing facial
recognition data or designing facial recognition technologies that conflict with an end user’s best interests.”).
2
See infra note 12; infra Part II.D.
3
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 11, 11 (2020)
[hereinafter Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy]; Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First
Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1186–87 (2016) [hereinafter Balkin, Information Fiduciaries]; Neil
Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law, 99 WASH. U. L. REV. 961, 964–65 (2021);
Lauren Henry Scholz, Fiduciary Boilerplate: Locating Fiduciary Relationships in Information Age Consumer
Transactions, 46 J. CORP. L. 143, 144–45 (2020); see also ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST:
INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN INFORMATION AGE 79–92 (2018) (exploring the relationship between privacy
and trust); Claudia E. Haupt, Platforms as Trustees: Information Fiduciaries and the Value of Analogy, 134
HARV. L. REV. F. 34, 35 (2020) (exploring the different possible fiduciary analogies in the information context).
4
JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF INFORMATIONAL
CAPITALISM 6 (2019); SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN
FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019) (providing a definition for “surveillance capitalism” on a page
titled “The Definition,” prior to the introduction).
5
E.g., Julie E. Cohen, Scaling Trust and Other Fictions, LPE PROJECT (May 29, 2019), https://
lpeproject.org/blog/scaling-trust-and-other-fictions/ [hereinafter Cohen, Scaling Trust and Other Fictions];
JULIE E. COHEN, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST., HOW (NOT) TO WRITE A PRIVACY LAW 2, 8 (2021), https://s3.
amazonaws.com/kfai-documents/documents/306f33954a/3.23.2021-Cohen.pdf [hereinafter COHEN, HOW (NOT) TO
WRITE A PRIVACY LAW].
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imposing a duty of loyalty might foreclose other approaches to platform
regulation.6 They charge that it is unworkable because corporations cannot
simultaneously owe duties both to their shareholders and to their customers.7
They claim that it is redundant because privacy laws modeled on Europe’s
GDPR already require a lawful basis for processing.8 These laws demand
consideration of data subjects’ rights and place substantive duties on data
processors.9 Finally, and most frequently, critics of a duty of loyalty assert that
it is vague—too burdensome, too likely to get watered down to empty
formalities through the process of compliance, and inevitably too unclear about
what it would actually require.10
Such critiques must be taken seriously. At first blush, their number and
variety might leave data loyalty advocates feeling a little bit like Goldilocks
holding her proverbial bowl of porridge: What’s in the bowl is likely too hot or
too cold, and in any event, is undoubtedly a bowl of mush. Well-intentioned but
potentially devastating criticisms of this sort require thoughtful consideration
and a comprehensive response. This essay represents that reflection and
response. In our own work, we have articulated a duty of loyalty for privacy law
as the duty of data collectors to act in the best interests of those whose data they
collect.11 While we borrow from fiduciary law and work on “information
fiduciaries,” we have advocated for new relational frameworks tailored to the
unique power imbalances between people and platforms.12 We agree with the
critics that a duty of loyalty for privacy law is neither perfect nor a tool for all
tasks. However, when the criticisms of loyalty are taken seriously—when they
are considered, evaluated, and responded to on the merits—loyalty reveals some
surprising virtues as a relational approach that collectively prioritizes trusting
parties’ best interests.
Loyalty, it turns out, places the focus for information-age problems where it
belongs: not primarily on the data, but on the human relationships that data can
6
Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV.
497, 534–36 (2019).
7
Id. at 504.
8
COHEN, HOW (NOT) TO WRITE A PRIVACY LAW, supra note 5, at 5–6.
9
Id. at 12.
10
See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, When All You Have Is a Fiduciary, LPE PROJECT (May 30, 2019),
https://lpeproject.org/blog/when-all-you-have-is-a-fiduciary/; COHEN, HOW (NOT) TO WRITE A PRIVACY LAW,
supra note 5, at 10–11.
11
See, e.g., Richards & Hartzog, supra note 3 (manuscript at 6–7); Woodrow Hartzog & Neil Richards,
Privacy’s Constitutional Moment and the Limits of Data Protection, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1741 (2020)
[hereinafter Hartzog & Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment].
12
See generally Richards & Hartzog, supra note 3 (manuscript at 4, 6–7) (advocating for a trust-focused
approach to privacy rules).
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affect; not just on procedural requirements for data processing but also on
substantive rules restricting dangerous applications; and not merely on the
interests of individuals but also on the interests of groups with the same
relational vulnerabilities. Loyalty can thus be a powerful state of mind with real
analytical and political consequences. Even loyalty’s supposed fatal flaw—its
indeterminate vagueness13—is actually a great strength of flexibility and
adaptability across contexts, cultures, and time. Simply put, loyalty as a
relational approach allows us to deal substantively with the problem of platforms
and human information at both a systemic and an individual level.
Our argument in this paper is ultimately a simple one: the concept of data
loyalty has surprising virtues, including checking power and limiting systemic
abuse. The critics of loyalty have provided the valuable service that generous
and constructive criticisms of an idea often perform. They allow loyalty to be
presented in a clearer, more refined, more detailed, and more realistic manner—
one that is better suited to addressing some (but not all) of the many problems
of information policy that cry out for solutions. Loyalty can thus be a key policy
tool with which to take on the related problems of information capitalism,
platform power, and the use of personal data to manufacture consent to
objectional data practices. In fact, it may well be the critical piece of the
regulatory toolkit for privacy.
We develop our argument across four parts, each of which responds to one
of the principal critiques of loyalty and each of which, in assessing those
critiques carefully, identifies one of loyalty’s surprising virtues. In Part I, we
consider the critique that relational protections, like a duty of loyalty, would not
solve the right problems for privacy law—specifically, that they would not be a
meaningful check on the excesses of informational capitalism and would not
address the root causes of corporate abuses of power facilitated by use of our
data. We conclude that the relationships between people and platforms are a key
element of these problems. One of the main virtues of a duty of loyalty is that it
remedies the misguided approach by lawmakers and judges that treats all
interactions between people and companies that offer online services as armslength relationships. The power imbalances in these relationships, made worse
by the remarkable power that digital technologies confer, are simply too great to
ignore. A duty of loyalty could usher in privacy’s relational turn.

13
See, e.g., Grimmelmann, supra note 10 (explaining why the duty of loyalty’s ambiguity can be
problematic); cf. COHEN, HOW (NOT) TO WRITE A PRIVACY LAW, supra note 5, at 10–11 (discussing the
difficulties of applying traditional fiduciary values to a digital context).
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In Part II, we consider the claim that a duty of loyalty would be unnecessary,
whether because it would be coextensive with a duty of care or consumer
protection law or because a European-style approach to data protection, modeled
on the GDPR, would be equally protective. We consider these objections and
make the case that data loyalty has several special virtues, including having its
own distinct purpose and also being able to fulfill a necessary supportive
function for data protection frameworks. Not only does a duty of loyalty offer
substantive protections that a GDPR-style approach does not but that loyalty can
also offer political and moral salience to rules that restrain the uses of human
information that European data protection terms like “data minimization” and
“legitimate interest” simply cannot. In this way, loyalty can be seen not just as a
state of mind, but as one with potentially powerful rhetorical and political
meaning that paves the way to a fruitful approach to technology regulation. A
duty of loyalty could thus be the key ingredient in the regulatory recipe for data
privacy.
In Part III, we address the critique that a duty of loyalty is unworkable, either
because it conflicts with a corporation’s fiduciary obligation to prioritize
shareholder interests over those of human customers or because of the potential
clash of individual interests between multiple parties all trusting the same entity.
We conclude that these potential conflicts are not only resolvable by lawmakers
but also that a turn to relational protections—instead of deferring to
informational self-determination14—would facilitate a substantive embrace of a
broad array of human values over privacy law’s reflexive deference to individual
choice, consent, and control. Data loyalty would also allow lawmakers to create
a uniform definition of “best interests” and thereby prioritize a collective,
systemic understanding of this concept over individual, idiosyncratic ones. In
this way, a duty of loyalty could be highly functional and consistent with other
legal rules across a host of areas.
Finally, in Part IV, we address the most frequent critique of a duty of loyalty
for privacy law—that it is too vague. There are three different versions of what
we might call the vagueness critique. The first is that if the duty of loyalty is
interpreted too broadly, then it could prove unduly burdensome and costly to
businesses. The second is that the indeterminacy of a duty of loyalty creates
14
By “informational self-determination,” we refer to the basic idea underlying data protection regimes
(particularly in Europe) rooted in the Fair Information Practices—that human autonomy and dignity are
advanced by giving people control over how their information is processed through the exercise of individual
data rights like choice, access, correction, deletion, etc. For an early discussion of this concept in the U.S. context,
see Paul Schwartz, The Computer in German and American Constitutional Law: Towards an American Right of
Informational Self-Determination, 37 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 675 (1989).
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room for companies to interpret their obligations in their weakest possible form,
watering them down to mere compliance exercises that provide little protection
for people and little hope for changing the incentives of abuse. The final version
of this argument is simply that if a duty of loyalty is not clarified, companies
might be left with no clue about what kinds of conduct are prohibited and what
data practices and design choices are permissible.
We believe that all three versions of the vagueness critique can be
meaningfully addressed with a properly articulated duty of loyalty. In fact, the
novelty of data loyalty and the method by which relational duties become
contoured to a relationship’s unique vulnerabilities opens the door for clear rules
targeting systemic abuses while preserving flexibility for the future. The fact
that a duty of loyalty can be applied broadly across contexts is actually a virtue,
as it is within other flexible, standards-based frameworks like negligence,
reasonableness, unfairness, and legitimate interests.
Our response begins with a survey of our law’s rich and long-standing
experience with loyalty duties in other areas—such as guardians, trusts,
professionals, and corporate shareholders—to show how lawmakers and judges
have refined the duty to make it clearer and easier to implement in certain
contexts while retaining its breadth and flexibility. Lawmakers use a two-step
process to implement loyalty obligations in a fair and just way. First, they
articulate a primary, general duty of loyalty for a group of actors. Next, courts
and lawmakers go about the task of creating and refining what has been referred
to as “subsidiary” duties that are more specific and sensitive to context. These
subsidiary duties target the most opportunistic contexts for self-dealing and
typically result in a mix of overlapping, open-ended rules, maxims, detailed
standards, and highly specific rules.15
Using the two-step model from fiduciary law, we suggest certain subsidiary
data loyalty rules targeting the five most likely areas ripe for disloyal and
harmful self-dealing. These vulnerable areas include the following: First, there
is Collection, the act of collecting, recording, and deciding to keep data about a
person. Second, there is Personalization, the act of treating people differently
based upon personal information or characteristics. Third, there is Gatekeeping,
the extent to which trusted entities allow third parties to access people and their
data. The fourth context is Influence, where companies leverage technologies to
exert sway over people to achieve results. Finally, there is Mediation, which

15
For a more detailed examination of this two-step process, and an explanation of how it could apply in
the data loyalty context, see generally Richards & Hartzog, supra note 3.
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concerns the way that organizations design their platforms to facilitate people
interacting with each other. Within these five contexts, we explore problems
such as discriminatory and harmful microtargeting, design that facilitates online
harassment, corrosive amplification of particular behavior, and abusive dark
patterns. We propose possible subsidiary loyalty rules and standards to mitigate
these kinds of disloyal behaviors. In this way, though it would not solve all
problems of data and platform power, a duty of loyalty could be both broad
enough to engage with many of those problems and specific enough to solve
each of them effectively.
We conclude that clarifying the duty of loyalty is, in fact, the single most
important factor enabling its potential as a key cog in a meaningful data privacy
framework. Critics of a duty of loyalty have rightfully identified that the power
of modern platforms is unprecedented and will require multiple new approaches
to disrupt it. Lawmakers and scholars have been moving privacy law towards a
particular relational focal point for a while now.16 It is time we give it a name:
loyalty.
I.

LOYALTY FOCUSES ON RELATIONSHIPS

From the beginning, U.S. privacy law has glossed over the ways that power
imbalances in relationships jeopardize our privacy. Lawmakers and judges have
largely ignored how relationships can be a key point of intervention. Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis’s foundational article The Right to Privacy rejected
relational protections such as breach of confidence and contracts because the
target of their proposed tort was complete strangers (particularly the new tabloid
Yellow Press).17 Courts recognizing the tort under the common law similarly
rejected relational approaches that followed Warren and Brandeis’s lead and
started focusing on privacy duties owed “to the world” via tort law, similar to
negligence.18 Today, with a few exceptions such as HIPAA and a handful of

16
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 1; 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a) (2018); Complaint for Permanent Injunction
and Other Equitable Relief at 20, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Age of Learning, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-07996 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 1, 2020); Elisa Jillson, Aiming for Truth, Fairness, and Equity in Your Company’s Use of AI, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2021/04/aiming-truth-fairnessequity-your-companys-use-ai.
17
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 211 (1890)
(“Thus, the courts, in searching for some principle upon which the publication of private letters could be
enjoined, naturally came upon the ideas of a breach of confidence, and of an implied contract; but it required
little consideration to discern that this doctrine could not afford all the protection required, since it would not
support the court in granting a remedy against a stranger . . . .”).
18
See, e.g., Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 152 (2007) (“[T]he four torts [William] Prosser identified became widely
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other confidentiality-based regimes, privacy and data protection law is generally
agnostic to the power imbalances within relationships or even whether a
relationship exists between people at all.19 The current U.S. approach to privacy
flattens the power dynamics within relationships with a giant caveat emptor sign.
Lawmakers permitted the failed “notice and choice” approach to privacy to
flourish in the wake of the decay of contract law protecting consumers against
boilerplate.20 On this shaky foundation, the thin veneer of fair information
practices that lacquered over this fault causes the law to ignore how companies
betray the people who trust them with their data and online experiences every
day.21
Even if it might have been rational for lawmakers and judges to ignore
information relationships in the past, our modern ongoing involvement with the
companies providing the apps and websites we use every day demands more
scrutiny. Is the person-platform relationship akin to the ones we have with
ordinary merchants like automobile or furniture dealers? Or is it more akin to
our intimate relationships with people that we trust with deeply personal
experiences and information, as well as our personal safety?22 The answer to this
question will affect what our rules for these relationships should be.
Julie Cohen worries that relational privacy duties of loyalty, care, and
confidentiality that have been proposed by some scholars fail to contend with
the “speed, immanence, automation, and scale” of the affordances of the
platform-consumer relationship.23 We agree that the affordances of modern
platforms and the business models motivated by them should be central to
lawmakers’ and judges’ approach to modern privacy problems. Yet, we would
suggest that one of the key virtues of data loyalty is that it accurately reflects
known as tort law’s way of protecting privacy. Breach of confidentiality was left out of the picture.”).
19
See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Chain-Link Confidentiality, 46 GA. L. REV. 657, 659 (2012); Woodrow
Hartzog, Reviving Implied Confidentiality, 89 IND. L.J. 763, 764 (2014); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A
Relational Turn for Data Protection Law?, 6 EUR. DATA PROT. L. REV. 492, 493, 495 (2020).
20
Hartzog & Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment, supra note 11, at 1690–91 n.6; Woodrow
Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV. 952, 979 (2017).
21
MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW
17 (2013); NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 5 (2013); Scholz, supra note
3, at 149–50; Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control over Personal
Information?, 111 PENN STATE L. REV. 587, 623 (2007); Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60
AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1643, 1645 (2011) [hereinafter Hartzog, Website Design as Contract]; Woodrow Hartzog,
The New Price to Play: Are Passive Online Media Users Bound by Terms of Use?, 15 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y
405, 415–16 (2010) [hereinafter Hartzog, The New Price to Play]; Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The
Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (2019).
22
See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1874 (2019) (discussing the
importance of sexual privacy to “sexual agency, intimacy, and equality”).
23
Cohen, Scaling Trust and Other Fictions, supra note 5.
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how the remarkable affordances of digital technologies result in wildly
imbalanced relationships. These relationships go far beyond the standard
merchant-customer dealings. They are a part of people’s everyday lives and have
an outsized impact on their well-being. When lawmakers treat all interaction
between people and companies that offer online services as arms-length
relationships, they ignore how the power of structure and scale create relational
vulnerabilities.
A. Arms-Length Relationships vs. Relationships of Trust
Arms-length relationships are typically those where parties with relatively
equal bargaining power act in service of their own self-interests in dealing with
each other.24 While the default presumption in market transactions is that parties
are operating at arms-length, when one party has significant power over the other
and an incentive to abuse that power, lawmakers often create duties and
restraints within these imbalanced relationships to protect vulnerable parties.25
These power imbalances can manifest in several ways, including large
disparities in information or knowledge, reliance on expertise or promises, and
discretion and control over the thing entrusted to one party in the relationship.26
A duty of loyalty won’t solve our modern data dilemma by itself, but our
next generation of privacy rules will never be complete until they recognize that
24
See, e.g., Gen. Assurance of Am., Inc. v. Overby-Seawell Co., 893 F. Supp. 2d 761, 780–81 (E.D. Va.
2012), aff’d, 533 F. App’x 200 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[A] fiduciary relationship is not created ‘between mutually
interdependent businesses with equal bargaining positions who dealt at arms-length.’ . . . Indeed, ‘[o]nly when
one party figuratively holds all the cards—all the financial power or technical information, for example—have
North Carolina courts found that the special circumstance of a fiduciary relationship has arisen.’” (quoting first
Cardiovascular Diagnostics Inc. v. Boehringer Mannheim Corp., 985 F. Supp. 615, 619–20 (E.D.N.C. 1997);
then S.N.R. Mgmt. Corp. v. Danube Partners 141, LLC, 659 S.E.2d 442 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008))); WEST’S TAX L.
DICTIONARY Arms Length § A2960 (2021) (“Status of a transaction by unrelated parties, each acting in its own
self interest. The term means a transaction made in good faith by parties with independent interests.”); 4C LARY
LAWRENCE, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2A-108:31 (3d ed. 2021) (“The comparative
bargaining power of the lessor and lessee is significant in determining whether the contract made by them is
unconscionable. . . . When a contract is negotiated at arm’s length in good faith between parties of equal
bargaining power and contains no unusual provisions, the contract will not be regarded as unconscionable merely
because one of the parties is disappointed with it.”); N. Shipping Funds I, LLC v. Icon Cap. Corp., 921 F. Supp.
2d 94, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Generally, no fiduciary duties arise where parties deal at arm’s length in
conventional business transactions.” (quoting Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am.
Sec., LLC, 592 F. Supp. 2d 608, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 2009))).
25
See Daniel B. Kelly, Fiduciary Principles in Fact-Based Fiduciary Relationships, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 3, 9 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019).
26
See, e.g., id. (“With regard to the ‘principal’ or beneficiary, a court is more likely to conclude that a
relationship is ‘fiduciary’ if a principal places confidence and trust in the agent; if a principal lacks expertise,
knowledge, sophistication, or experience; or if a principal depends or relies heavily upon the agent’s advice or
judgment.”).
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information relationships are imbalanced and susceptible to great abuse by the
dominant party. This is one of the main privacy problems addressed by a duty
of loyalty. Rather than treating all kinds of information relationships as equal
and fungible, it would increase obligations and restrictions on dominant parties
as they amass power. The more power a company has in a relationship, the more
protective and loyal it must be. A duty of loyalty would add an additional layer
to data privacy law. Privacy would no longer be primarily about the data;
instead, it would have to consider the relationships between people and the
companies to which they are exposed.27
Although the ongoing interactions between people and platforms might not
seem like a meaningful “relationship” in the traditional sense of the word, these
relationships give rise to the same relational dynamics and abuses that trust rules
are meant to address. At the outset, the interactions between people and
platforms are firmly established as legal relationships. Courts consistently bind
people who use websites and apps to the terms of use agreements imposed by
companies.28 Yet, technologically-mediated relationships between people and
companies are more than mere legal formalities, even if they are different from
the meaningful relationships we have with our friends, advisors, and employers.
Julie Cohen has argued that “[t]he mere fact of an ongoing service relationship
signifies relatively little in an era when relationships have been redefined as
mass-market products and are mediated by standardized interfaces designed for
large-scale, networked interconnection.”29 That may be true, but we think these
relationships also involve far more interplay, exposure, and personalization than
standard commercial services and widgets. In critiquing applying design and
consumer protection obligations in the language of trust, Cohen suggests that
although in a sense she trusts her desk chair not to collapse when she sits in it,
“it is far more useful to be able to speak concretely about such matters as material
tolerances and manufacturing specifications—and to be able to invoke
corresponding tort and regulatory frameworks—than it is to talk in airy
generalities about the nature of my relationship to the chair manufacturer.”30
We also agree with Cohen about the need to be more specific with the rules
for tech companies, which we address below. But the relationships that people
have with chair manufacturers, or even brick-and-mortar merchants and
27
See, e.g., Richards & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 497 (imagining a future in which privacy focuses
“directly on power imbalances in relationships rather than indirectly through data rules”).
28
Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, supra note 21, at 1644–45; Hartzog, The New Price to Play,
supra note 21, at 417.
29
COHEN, HOW (NOT) TO WRITE A PRIVACY LAW, supra note 5, at 10.
30
Id.
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providers of services in a pre-platform era, bear almost no resemblance to the
relationship between people and platforms. Critics of a duty of loyalty have
pointed out that treating platforms the same as a medical doctor, for example,
strips away the affordances of the platform and the realities of scale.31 But it is
the precise affordances of hardware and software that make the relationship
between people and platforms highly imbalanced and unique in ways that
compel relational rules, such as the duty of loyalty.
B. Key Traits of Modern Information Relationships
The relationship between people and platforms has at least five traits that,
when combined, make it highly imbalanced and worthy of intervention at the
relational level: the relationship (1) is ongoing, (2) is high frequency, (3) occurs
within an interactive environment, (4) operates within an environment
completely constructed for the individual, and (5) operates within an
environment that is responsive to the individual by the dominant party.32 Let’s
break these traits apart.
1. Ongoing
When people buy chairs, or ages ago, when they bought CD-ROMs
containing software in stores, such transactions are what we might think of as
discrete. Although Office Depot or Adobe hoped customers would return,
barring returns or malfunctions, the relationship between customer and
manufacturer or software developer typically had some distance and downtime.
Those days are long gone.33 Platforms leveraging browsers, apps, and cloud
computing have obliterated the concept of discrete one-time interactions.34

31
See, e.g., Cohen, Scaling Trust and Other Fictions, supra note 5 (“The information fiduciaries proposal
abstracts speed, immanence, automaticity, and scale away from that encounter and then assumes they never
mattered in the first place. In the process, it both sacrifices the fiduciary arrangement’s most essential
characteristics and fails to reckon adequately with the characteristics of the platform-consumer relationship that
are most problematic.”); Khan & Pozen, supra note 7, at 514 (imagining a doctor who relies on third-party
marketing for her income).
32
For an interesting approach to how laws might accommodate duties of loyalty and care in parties that
demand high degrees of trust but are not traditionally recognized as fiduciaries, see Ethan J. Leib, Friends as
Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665, 691 (2009) (“[F]iduciary law is about signaling to fiduciaries that they
ought not to be self-interested in transactions with and for their beneficiaries; it is generative of trust where costs
of distrust are especially high.”).
33
See Scholz, supra note 3, at 198 (“The ideal of the one-off consumer transaction is dead. Instead of
selling or licensing goods and services to consumers, firms today seek to build ongoing, evolving relationships
with consumers based on constant contact. This trend is likely to continue, as the always-on devices that
comprise the Internet of Things proliferate and cover an increasing number of everyday objects.”).
34
See id. at 151–54 (explaining that platforms track and collect customers’ information).
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Virtually every interaction requires an account creation with an intention of an
always-evolving delivery of services, often accompanied by email, app, or
operating system notifications. A platform’s ideal scenario is that once a person
signs up for a platform, they regularly visit and never leave. Systems are, to use
the parlance of Silicon Valley, “optimized for engagement.” Data and attention
continue to be given by consumers, and patches and updates continue to be
delivered by developers with no planned end date.35 Such a never-ending story
warrants rules matched to the nature of the relationship and ideally designed to
foster long term, sustainable, profitable relationships between people and
platforms.
2. Frequent
In addition to wanting to be with you forever, platforms want to be with you
constantly. People may go shopping in physical stores at most once or a few
times a week. They might take occasional advantage of an offline service like
babysitting or dry cleaning. But, on average, people interact with apps and
websites nearly a hundred times every day.36 Popular apps often get checked
multiple times within the same hour or minute.37 While we may commonly use
the same tool tens or hundreds of times a day (think how often you pick up a
pen, sit in a chair, or drink from a cup), we might think it strange to browse the
aisles of a store or call our financial advisor ten times a day, every day, for years
on end. But how many times have you checked your phone today? For
Facebook, Amazon, Google, Twitter, and a host of other dominant platforms,
failure to check in regularly is seen as a problem, and constant interaction from
the user is a rewarded metric. Here, too, the practice of notifications pushed to
the customer allow the frequency of interactions to be maintained. People can
be engaged in ongoing relationships without having to interact with them all the
time, but platforms ideally want both a long duration and a high frequency of
35
See, e.g., Alex Heath, Facebook’s Lost Generation, VERGE (Oct. 25, 2021, 7:00 AM), https://www.
theverge.com/22743744/facebook-teen-usage-decline-frances-haugen-leaks.
36
Americans Check Their Phones 96 Times a Day, ASURION (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.asurion.com/
about/press-releases/americans-check-their-phones-96-times-a-day/; Gabrielle Pickard-Whitehead, 66% of
Americans Check Phone 160 Times a Day, Here’s How Your Business Can Benefit, SMALL BUS. TRENDS
(Mar. 3, 2020), https://smallbiztrends.com/2020/03/2020-mobile-phone-usage-statistics.html; see also LEE
RAINIE & KATHRYN ZICKUHR, PEW RSCH. CTR., AMERICANS’ VIEWS ON MOBILE ETIQUETTE 12 (2015),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/08/26/chapter-1-always-on-connectivity/ (noting a high number of
smartphone users check their phone apps “continuously”); Average Time Spent Daily on Social Media (Latest
2022 Data), BROADBAND SEARCH, https://www.broadbandsearch.net/blog/average-daily-time-on-social-media
(last visited Apr. 26, 2022) (“On average, [we] spend . . .two hours and twenty-seven minutes[] on social media
each day.”).
37
See, e.g., supra note 36; Trevor Wheelwright, 2022 Cell Phone Usage Statistics: How Obsessed Are
We?, REVIEWS.ORG (Jan. 24, 2022), https://www.reviews.org/mobile/cell-phone-addiction/.
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engagement. For ad-driven businesses on an engagement business model, this is
the gold mine that generated the Facebook and Google fortunes, among the
fortunes of many others.38
3. Constructed
It is no secret that companies design their sales infrastructure to influence
their customers and clients.39 Grocery stores place milk and eggs at the opposite
side of the store from the entrance to encourage people to walk the aisles.40
Office designers make conference rooms totally transparent for when you want
everyone to see who you are meeting with, or completely opaque for when you
do not.41 It happens online as well. As Joel Reidenberg noted in his foundational
article Lex Informatica, companies leverage the power of information
technologies to create policy rules that affect people.42
But the extent to which tech companies control mediated environments is so
great that it deserves sustained scrutiny. Our dealings with platforms occur
entirely on their terms.43 They control who has access, what they see and do,
when they see it and take action, where they receive signals and make choices,
and why particular people see specific things and are given preconstructed
options.44 In unmediated relationships, people have a degree of flexibility to
work within a structured environment. They can choose from an endless array
of physical actions and social interactions and even change the structure of the
environment themselves, like moving the physical location items, modifying the
placement and content of signs, and switching between modes of
communication like writing or speaking.
But in digital environments, people can only click on the options they are
given. They can only address the audience they have been presented in the

38
See, e.g., Sarah Frier, Facebook Really Wants You to Come Back, Bloomberg (Jan. 31, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-01-31/facebook-really-wants-you-to-come-back.
39
See WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW
TECHNOLOGIES 34–35 (2018) (explaining that design shapes perceptions, behavior, and values).
40
Id. at 35.
41
Id.
42
Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through
Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 554–55 (1998) (“Technological capabilities and system design choices impose
rules on participants. The creation and implementation of information policy are embedded in network designs
and standards as well as in system configurations. Even user preferences and technical choices create
overarching, local default rules.”).
43
Cf. HARTZOG, supra note 39, at 1 (explaining tech companies leverage design to control privacy
settings); Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1000–03 (2014).
44
See HARTZOG, supra note 39.
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format provided. Structures are designed to eliminate accidents and serendipity,
save for the emergent behavior of automated outputs powered by machine
learning. And tech companies keep a tight leash on their bots. Our ability to
interrogate, analyze, question, tinker, learn, and otherwise calibrate our dealings
with tech companies is virtually nonexistent.45 As human users of these
technologies, we are essentially powerless. Data subject rights of access,
rectification, and deletion like those offered by the GDPR in theory empower us
a little, but in practice these rights are difficult to exercise at scale; since they are
limited only to personal data, data subject rights do very little to improve our
agency within constructed environments outside of personal data transparency
and management.46
4. Interactive
When people read newspapers or magazines, watch television, or listen to
the radio, they are essentially passive. There is no give and take between the
mind and the medium. The flow of information is one way. It would be a stretch
to call these interactions relationships, even when we have subscription contracts
with them.47 But of course, the relationship between people and platforms is
highly interactive. We create detailed accounts and profiles. We search, amass
networked connections, post pictures and status updates, press buttons, tweak
settings, adjust sliders, arrange layouts, and project information streams that we
don’t even know about. We essentially do uncompensated work that creates
huge value for them. And of course, all this interactivity can be further
quantified, optimized, and utilized to benefit the platform.
5. Responsive
The final component of modern information relationships is that the
ongoing, frequent, constructed, and interactive nature of the exchanges between
people and platforms enables companies to design their mediated environment
to be acutely responsive to people’s choices and profiles. News feeds, suggested
products, and information change on the fly according to previous clicks, and
profiles created from personal data accumulate over time. Our mediated
environments are tweaked based on individual data and up-to-the-second

45
46
47

See id. chs. 2 & 6.
See Daniel J. Solove, The Limitations of Privacy Rights, 98 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2023).
See, e.g., Hartzog, The New Price to Play, supra note 21, at 405–06.
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wisdom from constant experiments on us through A/B testing designed to
maximize engagement and keep our eyes glued to the screen.48
This powerful incentive for such “growth hacking” makes the uniquely
intertwined relationship between platforms and people incredibly dangerous.49
It is far from what should be considered arms-length. Arms-length relationships
might have one or two of the traits listed above. But no legal, commercial, or
social relationship on earth, from merchants to professionals to employers to
loved ones, features the same potent combination of traits as modern
technologically-mediated information relationships. Platforms cannot be armslength when they are already living in in our heads.
We do not mean to imply that information relationships present wholly
unique problems. Rather, our analysis of the affordances of information
technologies suggests that it would be a mistake to treat these relationships as
arms-length, even if they are cabined to some extent by consumer protection and
data protection rules. They are too one-sided and prone to abuse to tolerate any
arms-length fiction. A duty of loyalty is not sufficient to solve all our privacy
problems. But it is necessary so long as the affordances of the tools, incentives
for self-dealing, and legal contracting status of the parties places people in
danger every time they create an account online. In this way, a surprising virtue
of a loyalty approach is that it reveals how modern information relationships do
not resemble anything approaching arms-length transactions. Once lawmakers
fix this problem and embrace the relational turn in privacy law, several different
possibilities open up, including supporting public governance, new substantive
rules, and a less individualistic approach to privacy.
II. LOYALTY ACHIEVES WHAT CARE CANNOT
A second set of critiques surrounding a duty of loyalty is that it would be
unnecessary. These criticisms take a variety of forms. Responding to Jack
Balkin’s proposal to impose common law fiduciary duties (including a duty of
loyalty) on platforms, Lina Khan and David Pozen have suggested that imposing
fiduciary duties like loyalty on platforms might (1) do little in practice and (2)
48

See, e.g., Calo, supra note 43.
The term “growth hacking” has been adopted to refer to aggressive strategies by tech companies to
grow their user base quickly and significantly. For more information on growth hacking, see RAYMOND FONG
& CHAD RIDDERSEN, GROWTH HACKING: SILICON VALLEY’S BEST KEPT SECRET (2017); Timo Herttua, Elisa
Jakob, Sabrina Nave, Rambabu Gupta & Matthäus P. Zylka, Growth Hacking: Exploring the Meaning of an
Internet-Born Digital Marketing Buzzword, in DESIGNING NETWORKS FOR INNOVATION AND IMPROVISATION
151, 151–61 (2016); René Bohnsack & Meike Malena Liesner, What the Hack? A Growth Hacking Taxonomy
and Practical Applications for Firms, 62 BUS. HORIZONS 799 (2019).
49
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forestall other, more radical approaches to the consumer protection problems
raised by platforms, including those involving competition law.50 There are
other forms of this critique, too, suggesting that loyalty duties are unnecessary
because (3) a duty of care placed on data collectors would be sufficient, or that
(4) an American version of Europe’s GDPR could solve the problem.51 Each of
the four variants of the “loyalty is unnecessary” argument are worth addressing
briefly in turn because doing so reveals the surprising virtue that loyalty is not
only necessary but also potentially inspirational. Loyalty, in other words,
represents a state of mind with revolutionary potential for privacy reform.
A. Loyalty Makes People’s Choices Less Dangerous
First, with respect to Khan and Pozen’s suggestion that imposing fiduciary
duties like a duty of loyalty on platforms might do little in practice,52 we must
respectfully disagree, at least as regards the version of a duty of loyalty we
articulate in this paper and in other work. As privacy law scholarship has
documented at length, the current default model of U.S. privacy law is one of
“notice and choice,” under which firms are subject to three principal rules: (1)
do not lie about data practices, (2) do not cause unreasonable harm (reasonable
harm is just fine), and (3) do follow the Fair Information Practices, most notably
“notice and choice.”53 In practice, these rules mean that companies can largely
do what they want with human data as long as they have a vague privacy policy,
do not cause significant economic or other harm, and do not lie about what they
are doing in their often inscrutable privacy notices. A duty of loyalty would
change this situation considerably by placing an enforceable obligation on
companies to act in the best interests of their human customers, rather than
allowing them to rely on vague terms and conditions hidden in a privacy policy
to justify whichever data practices serve their own purposes most efficiently.
This would mean that humans making choices could rest easy that one of the
choices they were given would allow betrayal or manipulation by the company.
Because betrayal or manipulation would be taken off the table, they could
50
Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 534–35. Pozen and Khan are particularly alarmed by a proposal by
Jack Balkin and Jonathan Zittrain to create a “grand bargain” for platforms in which fiduciary duties would be
imposed in exchange for a preemption of state privacy laws (and, Pozen and Khan fear, for competition
regulators paying less attention to the anticompetitive effects of platform size and power). Id. at 535.
51
See Hartzog & Richards. Privacy’s Constitutional Moment, supra note 11, at 1713 (discussing
proposals for a U.S. GDPR); see also Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 522, 535 (alleging the redundancy of
information fiduciary proposals).
52
Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 534.
53
See, e.g., HARTZOG, supra note 39, at 58; Richards & Hartzog, supra note 20, at 1463, 1471; Hartzog
& Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment, supra note 11, at 1704; Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy
Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1883 (2013).
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choose knowing that all choices were safe ones, rather than ones that exposed
them to unforeseeable dangers at the hands of the company. Placing duties of
loyalty on information collectors would thus “be a revolution in privacy law.”54
B. Loyalty Complements Other Interventions
Second, we must also disagree with Khan and Pozen’s claim that the
imposition of a duty of loyalty would foreclose other promising means of
addressing the relatively unchecked power of platforms over our lives and the
economy.55 We believe that a duty of loyalty must be one piece of a much larger
regulatory response—not merely to the problems of platform power and
unchecked informational capitalism but also to the problems of the information
revolution as a whole. The challenges of the industrial revolution were not
checked by a single legal rule like negligence, workplace safety, speed limits,
food labeling laws, or a prohibition on unfair and deceptive trade practices.56
Similarly, it defies both the insights of legal history and common sense to think
that a duty of loyalty, or any other rule in isolation, would solve the problems of
the information revolution. Indeed, in other work, we have argued in detail that
our approach to these problems must be multipronged and explicitly include
what we call “corporal” regulation, involving corporate and competition law, as
any part of a solution to the problems of platform power.57 (We also note in
conclusion that Khan and Pozen’s critique was tailored to Jack Balkin’s
“information fiduciary” model—a proposal that involves the imposition of statelaw fiduciary duties on platforms and has substantial differences from the duty
of loyalty we articulate here and in other papers.)58
C. Loyalty Avoids the Harm Trap
Third, with respect to the suggestion that a duty of loyalty would add little
that a duty of care would not already cover, such a suggestion misunderstands
the critical differences between duties of care and duties of loyalty. To be sure,

54

Richards & Hartzog, supra note 3 (manuscript at 72).
Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 513–14.
56
See, e.g., Judson MacLaury, Government Regulation of Workers’ Safety and Health, 1877-1917, U.S.
DEP’T OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/mono-regsafeintrotoc (last visited Apr. 26, 2022);
Xaq Frohlich, The Informational Turn in Food Politics: The U.S. FDA’s Nutrition Label as Information
Infrastructure, 47 SOC. STUD. SCI. 145 (2017); Dee Pridgen, The Dynamic Duo of Consumer Protection: State
and Private Enforcement of Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Laws, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 911, 912–14 (2017)
(discussing the development of state and federal trade practice laws, which began well after the end of the
Industrial Revolution in the United States).
57
See Hartzog & Richards, Privacy’s Constitutional Moment, supra note 11, at 1742–45.
58
Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 501.
55

HARTZOGRICHARDS_5.20.22

2022]

5/25/2022 1:45 PM

VIRTUES OF DATA LOYALTY

1003

duties of loyalty and care share a common genealogy: they, along with the duty
of confidentiality, are the three most basic fiduciary duties.59 It follows from this
fact that the three duties have distinct components. The duty of care requires that
fiduciaries take care not to cause harm to those they owe fiduciary duties—most
often, the vulnerable parties that the law steps in to protect like wards,
shareholders, and professional clients.60 Its cousin negligence, one of the
common law’s many responses to the Industrial Revolution, imposes a weaker
duty as against the whole world not to act unreasonably and thus cause harm.61
Duties of care and negligence are therefore rooted in reasonable behavior and
harm avoidance—I have to act in a way that is reasonable under the
circumstances, so as not to cause you harm, and if I fail to do that, you can sue
me to remedy the harm I caused.
Loyalty is different from care. It is not about my state of mind with respect
to the injury I cause. Loyalty is instead about avoiding betrayal. It is about my
state of mind with respect to your best interests, and it is about not exploiting
conflicts of interest for my own advantage.62 For instance, a clear example of
disloyalty would be when Target Corporation famously discovered that its
pregnant customers did not like receiving coupons that revealed Target’s data
scientists had figured out they were pregnant.63 Target changed its marketing
practices to hide the coupons in a sea of intentionally irrelevant ones (like wine
glasses and lawn mower blades) so that its customers would use the coupons
instead of freaking out, and then become habituated Target customers once the
baby arrived and they ran out of energy.64 Such use of sensitive information
about current customers is legal under current U.S. law.65 It has nothing to do
with any duty of care, but it would be a clear violation of a duty of loyalty.
At bottom, then, care is about avoiding harm while loyalty is about avoiding
betrayal.66 The legal wrong in a breach of care is the resulting economic,
59

See Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 3, at 1207–08; Haupt, supra note 3, at 36.
Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 3, at 1207–08.
61
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 183 (1941).
62
Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 3, at 1208.
63
Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 19, 2012, at 30.
64
Id. For an elaboration of this point, see NEIL RICHARDS, WHY PRIVACY MATTERS 33–37 (2022).
65
See generally Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125 (2015) (exploring the category
of sensitive information in data privacy frameworks).
66
To complete the set, the legal wrong in a breach of a duty of confidentiality is an improper disclosure
of confidential information. See Richard Painter, Fiduciary Principles in Legal Representation, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 265, 269–71 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019); TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY
LAW, 107–08 (2008) (“The duty of loyalty supports the main purpose of fiduciary law: to prohibit fiduciaries
from misappropriating or misusing entrusted property or power. Thus, the duty of loyalty is manifested by
important preventative rules. Such rules prohibit actions even though they are not necessarily injurious to
60
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physical, or other kind of harm, but the legal wrong of disloyalty is, first and
foremost, the damage done to the relationship itself. This is a particularly
significant distinction for privacy law because plaintiffs in privacy and data
breach lawsuits have struggled to articulate diffuse but real informational
injuries. This situation has been made worse in recent years as courts have
substantially tightened the rules for what counts as a legally cognizable
“concrete” injury under Article III standing doctrine.67 A new and stringent
requirement of “concreteness” makes it more difficult to prove harm and
threatens the ability of legislatures to authorize novel forms of legal remedies.
Crucially, though, loyalty does not have this problem—not merely because the
legal injury in loyalty cases is the disloyalty itself but also because this injury is
one that has been already recognized by courts as legally sufficient within
standing doctrine.68 To the extent the tightening of standing doctrine means that
only long-recognized claims can be brought in federal court, another surprising
virtue of a duty of loyalty is that it is an old common-law doctrine, and thus,
breaches of loyalty are undeniably concrete and actionable.
In sum, then, duties of loyalty and duties of care are distinct. Duties of care
are about acting reasonably to avoid harm, but the focus of loyalty is on the
sanctity of a relationship and removing an incentive and ability to wrongfully
profit by taking advantage of a power disparity. We believe that privacy law has
room for both duties of care and of loyalty, but they should not be conflated
because they serve different purposes. Critically, because loyalty duties are
rooted in betrayal rather than harm, they have significant consumer protection
advantages that care duties do not.69
entrustors.”).
67
E.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–49 (2016).
68
To get a bit technical, in Spokeo terms, then, a breach of a legally-imposed duty of loyalty would be a
“concrete” intangible harm. To satisfy this requirement, Spokeo requires courts “to consider whether an alleged
intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a
lawsuit in English or American courts.” Id. at 1549. But because a breach of a duty of loyalty has been recognized
as such a basis for centuries, duties of loyalty do not raise this Spokeo problem. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron
& Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Harms, 102 B.U. L. REV. 793, 860–61 (2022); TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW
107–08 (2011) (“The duty of loyalty supports the main purpose of fiduciary law: to prohibit fiduciaries from
misappropriating or misusing entrusted property or power. Thus, the duty of loyalty is manifested by important
preventative rules. Such rules prohibit actions even though they are not necessarily injurious to entrustors.”). By
contrast, although duties of care in general would be concrete, statutory causes of action rooted in novel theories
of harm would seem to have to run through the Spokeo test.
69
See Data Care Act of 2019, S. 2961, 116th Cong. §§ 2–3(b)(2) (2019) (“Duty of Loyalty: An online
service provider may not use individual identifying data, or data derived from individual identifying data, in any
way that—(A) will benefit the online service provider to the detriment of an end user; and (B) (i) will result in
reasonably foreseeable and material physical or financial harm to an end user; or (ii) would be unexpected and
highly offensive to a reasonable end user.”); Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2968, 116th Cong. § 101
(2019) (“Duty of Loyalty: (a) In General.—A covered entity shall not—(1) engage in a deceptive data practice
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D. Loyalty Animates Legislation and Enforcement
Fourth, and finally, while the notion of a U.S. GDPR may have intuitive
appeal in theory, we believe that any such law would be insufficiently protective
in practice. There are several reasons for this conclusion, but the most important
one is that U.S. privacy rights against companies are different from those in the
European Union. In the United States, such rights would likely be consumer
protection rights protecting economic interests and could be whittled down in
the legislative process by tech company lobbying efforts. By contrast, the GDPR
rests upon a solid constitutional footing of fundamental rights to privacy that are
simply not present under current American law. In sharp contrast to the United
States, E.U. fundamental rights law has long protected privacy as an explicit
constitutional right.70 Today, the E.U. Charter recognizes two separate
fundamental rights to privacy: a right to “respect for his or her private and family
life,” in Article 7, and a separate right to “protection of personal data,” in Article
8.71 Moreover, these European rights are subject to the doctrine of “horizontal
effect.” Under this doctrine, a member state can violate a person’s fundamental
rights when it fails to protect it sufficiently against violations by other members
of society.72 Thus, the GDPR’s guarantee of privacy and data protection rights
against companies is more than mere commercial regulation—because it is the
direct implementation and extension of constitutional rights, the GDPR should
be understood as having constitutional status.
Similarly, as we have just noted, American privacy plaintiffs have struggled
to overcome the hurdles of limited remedies and procedural obstacles like
Article III standing doctrine. Again, by contrast, European data protection
plaintiffs have achieved a remarkable string of victories vindicating rights under
the GDPR and its precursor, the Data Protection Directive, establishing the
“right to be forgotten” and invalidating both data retention rules and inadequate
cross-border transfer agreements.73 Crucial to these results has been the
or a harmful data practice; or (2) process or transfer covered data in a manner that violates any provision of this
Act.”).
70
E.g., Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
71
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 7–8, Nov. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326).
72
Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L. REV. 387, 395,
397 (2003) (describing the European horizontal effect doctrine as “impos[ing] constitutional duties on private
actors as well as on government”).
73
Case C‐131/12, Google Spain v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) & Mario Costeja
González, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶¶ 91, 94 (May 13, 2014); see, e.g., Case C‐293/12 and Case C‐594/12, Digital
Rts. Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Commc’ns, Marine and Nat. Res. & Kärntner Landesregierung and Others,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, ¶¶ 66–71 (Apr. 8, 2014); Case C‐362/14, Maximillian Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, ¶ 102 (Oct. 6, 2015).
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European Court of Justice (CJEU), the highest court for questions of E.U. law.
In these and other cases, the CJEU has simultaneously established these new
data protection rights while also establishing its own relevance as a major player
in the new European constitutional order.74 As Bilyana Petkova has argued, the
CJEU’s decisions have enshrined data protection as “the main tenet of
constitutional identity” in the European Union.75 This is why European data
protection law often seems so strikingly powerful to American observers
compared to domestic consumer privacy rights.76 As much as anything, then, the
GDPR is a state of mind for Europeans. And it is why a U.S. version of the
GDPR would inevitably be both a weak and inadequate version of the real
GDPR, something we have elsewhere termed “GDPR-lite.”77
To be sure, a GDPR-like approach has undeniable virtues, even in a
weakened “GDPR-lite” form. The European model of data protection regulation
is the product of great wisdom, experience, and effort. Its framework has proven
resilient and durable across the decades, and data protection rules can be
formidable and empowering when done properly. It also offers an emerging
global standard for interoperable data sharing. But the data protection model has
some real weaknesses as well. It can treat data processing as something
inevitable or even virtuous, with the effect of normalizing surveillance and
processing. To the extent that data protection rights are usually long on
procedural requirements, they are often short on the kinds of substantive
prohibitions that would take certain kinds of invidious data uses off the table.
And data protection rules focus primarily on the data itself, rather than on the
relationships and in the contexts in which those data are collected, used, and
disclosed.78 Perhaps, then, it should be no surprise that EU regulators are starting
to flirt with imposing substantive loyalty duties upon the largely procedural
GDPR baseline. In the European Union, regulators have proposed a new draft
data governance act that includes a duty of loyalty for data. And in post-Brexit

74
Joshua P. Meltzer, The Court of Justice of the European Union in Schrems II: The Impact of GDPR on
Data Flows and National Security, BROOKINGS (Aug. 5, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-courtof-justice-of-the-european-union-in-schrems-ii-the-impact-of-gdpr-on-data-flows-and-national-security/.
75
Bilyana Petkova, Privacy as Europe’s First Amendment, 25 EUR. L.J. 140, 154 (2019).
76
See, e.g., Aarti Shahani, 3 Things You Should Know About Europe’s Sweeping New Data Privacy Law,
NPR (May 24, 2018, 11:37 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2018/05/24/613983268/a-cheat-sheeton-europe-s-sweeping-privacy-law (discussing the GDPR and its robust protection for consumer data privacy
and noting concerns that GDPR will “hurt businesses that rely on data collection”).
77
For an extended version of an argument along these lines, see Hartzog & Richards, Privacy’s
Constitutional Moment, supra note 11, at 1727–32.
78
Id. at 1717–21.
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Britain (where the GDPR still applies), the British Information Commissioner’s
Office has imposed a duty of loyalty on those who process children’s data.79
This analysis points us towards the first of the surprising virtues of a duty of
loyalty for privacy law. Loyalty is not ineffective or redundant. On the contrary,
loyalty is both powerful and distinctive. Loyalty can be a state of mind for
American privacy reform, one that could offer the same vitality and political
salience in American legal culture that the fundamental right of data protection
possesses in Europe. As we have seen, the GDPR is the manifestation of data
protection as a fundamental human right, which itself is a commitment to the
idea that people should be able to determine their informational fates for
themselves. But when it comes to data privacy in the United States, we lack an
equivalent coherent guiding light. “The right to be let alone” worked for a while,
but it has crumbled under its capaciousness. “Do not lie” and “do not harm” are
bedrock ideals, but they are also the status quo—and it is clear that the status
quo is inadequate. “Follow the fair information practices” (FIPs), while
necessary, is about as inspirational as a CVS receipt.80 And we have already seen
that a U.S. version of the GDPR would be insufficient.
A duty of loyalty could fill this role for U.S. privacy law. Of course, loyalty
cannot solve all privacy problems on its own. But it can do three important
things. First, loyalty can supplement public governance of privacy rules by
authorizing effective private rights of action for breaches of the duty—ones that
sidestep the standing doctrine problems that have plagued harm-based theories
of relief.81 Second, loyalty could supply an interpretive lodestar to U.S. privacy
law, an equivalent to Europe’s robust protection of existing data protection rules,
and one that even improves upon some of the limitations of the European
approach.
Third, and perhaps most important, loyalty could supply a political lodestar
for privacy reform more generally. In contrast to technocratic terms like “data
minimization” and “legitimate interests of the data controller,” loyalty is clear,
it is easy to understand, and it is potentially robust enough to counterbalance
industry claims about the importance of “innovation” or the seductive but false
79
See Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
European Data Governance (Data Governance Act), at 18–19, COM (2020) 767 final (Nov. 25, 2020); INFO.
COMM’RS OFF., AGE APPROPRIATE DESIGN: A CODE OF PRACTICE FOR ONLINE SERVICES 9–10 (2020).
80
See generally Hartzog, supra note 20 (presenting a balanced view of the strengths and shortcomings of
FIPs).
81
Scholz, supra note 3, at 197 (“If public regulation is needed to further protect consumers, as is likely,
the information-sharing and norm-sharing function of fiduciary duties, as described above, will aid in the
development of appropriate consumer protection laws through the information-forcing . . . .”).
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idea that commercial data processing carries First Amendment value. If
companies owe us duties of loyalty, then “innovative” uses of data to exploit us
start to resemble betrayal and fraud, and claims of First Amendment protection
for manipulative uses of data look appropriately laughable. Loyalty also has the
virtue of placing the obligation for ethical data processing right where it belongs,
ensuring those to whom we expose our data vulnerabilities do not betray us. In
this way, loyalty can be a state of mind; one that has revolutionary potential to
stimulate meaningful privacy reform.
III. LOYALTY PRIORITIZES HUMAN VALUES
One of the most prominent critiques levied against the idea of imposing
duties of data loyalty on companies is Khan and Pozen’s claim that relational
rules might create conflicting loyalties. The authors assert that “[t]he tension
between what it would take to implement a fiduciary duty of loyalty to users, on
the one hand, and these companies’ economic incentives and duties to
shareholders, on the other, is too deep to resolve without fundamental reform.”82
Khan and Pozen reject the idea of conflicting loyalties as well as the possibility
of prioritizing the interests of customers over shareholders, which they contend
would conflict with the dominant understanding of corporate law.
Responding to this criticism highlights another surprising virtue of data
loyalty: it prioritizes people over profits and, in doing so, facilitates a substantive
embrace of a broad array of human values over privacy law’s reflexive deference
to individual choice, consent, and control. Lawmakers and industry love “notice
and choice” proceduralism because it allows them to avoid the difficult task of
prioritizing human interests and making substantive interventions. If preferences
vary wildly, then this fallacy tempts us, and surely an approach rooted in choice
would solve the problem. But lawmakers imposing a duty of loyalty cannot
avoid this task. In essence, lawmakers embracing a properly conceptualized duty
of loyalty would center human values at the heart of our information rules while
simultaneously clarifying the order of operations regarding duties owed to
different parties.

82
Khan & Pozen, supra note 6, at 534. The authors also note that “the information-fiduciary proposal
could cure at most a small fraction of the problems associated with online platforms—and to the extent it does,
only by undercutting directors’ duties to shareholders, undermining foundational principles of fiduciary law, or
both.” Id. at 529.
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A. Data Loyalty’s Illusory Conflicts
As an initial matter, the “divided loyalties” argument against relational
duties is debatable and, at most, can be fixed by lawmakers without substantially
remaking corporate law.83 Andrew Tuch argues that Khan and Pozen
“significantly overstate the threat that corporate and fiduciary law pose for the
information fiduciary model.”84 Tuch explains that “imposing user-regarding
obligations on corporations will not create untenable frictions between duties to
users and duties to shareholders. . . . [T]he primary criticism—that Delaware
corporate law undermines the information fiduciary regime—should be
dismissed.”85
Tuch also argues that “the plausible outcome of an information fiduciary
regime is exactly the opposite of what Khan and Pozen fear. Under the
information fiduciary model, corporate law would require compliance with userregarding obligations, creating incentives for directors to favor users’ interests
over those of shareholders.”86 In other words, the loyalty that directors owe to
shareholders takes a backseat to all other legal obligations placed upon the
corporation, including duties of loyalty to customers.87 In fact, if a duty of data
83
See, e.g., Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, supra note 3, at 23 (“Management’s fiduciary
obligations to shareholders assume that the corporation will attempt to comply with the legal duties owed to
those affected by the corporation’s business practices, even if this reduces shareholder value.”).
84
Andrew F. Tuch, A General Defense of Information Fiduciaries, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 1897, 1902,
1909–10 (2021). Tuch argues that corporate law only imposes duties on directors, not corporations, and the
information fiduciaries proposal imposes duties on corporations, not directors. Id. Relational duties would not
create a set of inconsistent obligations among a single fiduciary. The issue of parallel fiduciary obligations owed
by corporations as a whole to clients and directors to shareholders is routine. Not only is “the likelihood of
fiduciary breach that Khan and Pozen point to in claiming tension between Balkin’s proposal and corporate law
. . . theoretically remote,” it is “in practical terms, nonexistent.” Id. at 1915. Additionally, if lawmakers obligate
a duty of loyalty, then directors are bound to privilege it over shareholder interests. Id. at 1916–17 (“Delaware
law altogether avoids tension with regimes such as Balkin’s. Delaware corporate law requires directors to
exercise their discretion within legal limits imposed on the corporation; it does not license or excuse noncompliance with corporate obligations, even if directors believe that doing so would maximize shareholder
value. And Delaware law offers no suggestion that a corporation’s duties or responsibilities should be diluted or
otherwise shaped by the content of directors’ duties. Instead, case law indicates clearly that directors must act
‘within the law.’”).
85
Id. at 1902 (“The criticism rests on a partial understanding of corporate law doctrine and theory. The
criticism sees conflicting obligations where none plausibly exist and identifies strategies for resolving these
apparent conflicts that are unknown to corporate law. . . . I also argue that Khan and Pozen’s arguments are not
merely mistaken but, if accepted, may do harm. Applying their case to financial conglomerates—more apt
analogues for social media companies than the ‘[d]octors, lawyers, accountants, and the like’ to whom scholars
often draw their comparison—shows that Khan and Pozen’s arguments, if accepted, would have pernicious
effects on broad spheres of corporate regulation.”).
86
Id.
87
Id. at 1917–18 (“Reflecting corporate law’s attitude toward legal compliance, former Harvard Law
Dean Robert Clark identifies the corporation’s purpose as to ‘maximize the value of the company’s shares,
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loyalty owed by platforms to people is made positive law, a director that acts
with the intent to act in conflict with a customer’s best interests or who fails to
act in the face of a known loyalty obligation may be liable for breach to
shareholders of their fiduciary obligation as well as their duty to customers.88
It is thus indisputable that lawmakers can place duties of data loyalty on
corporations. But, if they do so, they must prioritize loyalties. This would resolve
any lingering “divided loyalty” concerns regarding shareholders, as well as
conflicting loyalties between customers and third-party vendors. Self-interested
actions would be allowed, but only if they don’t conflict with a customer’s best
interests regarding their data and mediated experiences. Duties of data loyalty
thus face no problems from other state laws. Moreover, a federal law imposing
data loyalty obligations would avoid the Khan and Pozen conflicting loyalty
argument for a second reason: it is an elementary principle of U.S. constitutional
law that a federal duty of loyalty would take precedence over any state duties by
operation of the Supremacy Clause. The federal minimum wage law is consistent
with shareholder fiduciary duties, and a federal duty of loyalty would be as well.
But what about conflicts between different kinds of customers? James
Grimmelmann noted that platforms like eBay serve both buyers and sellers,
serving up potentially conflicting loyalties.89 To Grimmelmann’s example, we
could also add Uber and Lyft serving drivers and passengers, AirBnb serving
renters and leasers, and even Google serving advertiser and human users of its
services. This, too, is a common problem in the law of fiduciaries, which has
developed several ways to deal with such inevitable conflicts. Andrew Gold
explains that “conflicts among best interests obligations [owed to multiple
beneficiaries] are unavoidable. Where such conflicts exist, one answer is to find
that loyalty must manifest itself as fairness and reasonableness. Another answer
is to impose a duty of impartiality,” which would demand “due regard” (though
not necessarily equality).90 The “best interests” polestar of loyalty, by design,
accommodates all kinds of self-serving behavior. It simply makes self-serving

subject to the constraint that the corporation must meet all its legal obligations to others who are related to or
affected by it.’ . . . Even the most ardent advocates of shareholder primacy have not suggested that corporate
law requires, or should require, corporations or directors to maximize shareholder value in violation of a
corporation’s legal obligations.”).
88
See id. at 1919 n.120 (citing In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)); see
also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (“The failure to act in good faith may result in liability
[for directors] because the requirement to act in good faith ‘is a subsidiary element[,]’ i.e., a condition, ‘of the
fundamental duty of loyalty.’” (citing Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003))).
89
Grimmelmann, supra note 10.
90
Andrew S. Gold, The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 385,
390, 398 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019).
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behavior allowable only in instances where it aligns with the best interests of the
primary trusting party.91 Even among the same type of customer, a reasonable
critique of applying a novel duty of loyalty to large tech companies is that these
entities would be obligated to act in the best interests of billions of individuals,
whose “best interests” might differ from person to person. There are several
steps that lawmakers might take to help resolve this looming conflict.
The first step would be to limit the scope of the duty to the extent of the
vulnerability. Trusted parties must be loyal when collecting and processing
people’s data and making design choices that affect their mediated experiences.
Under this rule, consideration of a trusting party’s best interests would be limited
to what was entrusted, the purpose of exposure and the relationship, and whether
a trusted party’s actions relating to that exposure are self-serving and adversarial
to a human customer’s wishes or well-being. So, for example, under such an
approach, Snapchat would not generally be responsible for making sure their
app users were responsible drivers, but they would be prohibited from taking
money from car insurance companies to create a mini-game asks people to
upload pictures of them driving so that insurance companies could track them
and increase their premiums for dangerous drivers. Snapchat would also be
prohibited from creating algorithms that amplified other people’s driving videos
solely for the purpose of distorting how popular the driving game was and to
juice engagement metrics.92 However, Snapchat degrading or blocking an app
user’s driving videos would not count as a breach of loyalty because deleting
posts in this context would not increase their vulnerabilities from exposure.
Limiting a trusting party’s “bests interests” to those affected by its exposure of
data and attention would help keep loyalty-bound companies from having to
serve as general-purpose caretakers for trusting parties.
Regarding the difficulties of accounting for the “best interests” of millions
of unique trusting parties, lawmakers could also follow tort law’s move to a more
objective standard: the reasonable customer. Not only would a reasonable
customer standard help companies better determine the scope of their duties but
it would also inject a normative element into the analysis. A reasonable customer
91
See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114
YALE L.J. 929, 932 (2005) (“[A] transaction prudently undertaken to advance the best interest of the beneficiaries
best serves the purpose of the duty of loyalty, even if the trustee also does or might derive some benefit. A
transaction in which there has been conflict or overlap of interest should be sustained if the trustee can prove
that the transaction was prudently undertaken in the best interest of the beneficiaries.”).
92
James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 929–31 (2014) (resenting a “subjective
dishonesty” standard for search engines); Grimmelmann, supra note 10 (arguing that since a search engine
“requires substantial discretion to determine what its users consider relevant” (because different people might
want different things), the legal system should defer to search engines’ best judgments).
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approach would also be consistent with the parallel duty of care and sensitive to
the fact that tech companies deal in bulk and batched relationships. A
reasonableness, context-sensitive approach would require loyalty obligations
that are proportional to the risks of abuse. The duty would be the most robust
where the volume of data collected, the company’s role in mediating other
transactions and relationships, and the potential for manipulation are the
greatest. Because this duty of loyalty would be new and novel for privacy law
and would need to be tailored to the unique characteristics of modern
information relationships, lawmakers can craft a unique and tailored approach
that borrows from how duties of loyalty operate in other contexts without being
bound by them.
B. The Diverse Value-Forcing Function of Data Loyalty
In fact, the need to clarify how a duty of loyalty would work within
information relationships could help bring a substance and normative
commitment that has been missing in privacy law. Lawmakers who embraced a
data loyalty approach would be forced to make substantive decisions about who
is protected, who is duty-bound, and what specific conduct is prohibited in
service of specific goals beyond just informational self-determination.
For years, lawmakers have avoided the hard questions of whether privacy
law should serve any goal beyond giving people control over their personal
information and respecting their choices about their data. But informational
capitalism is jeopardizing so much more than that, including our civil rights,
intellectual self-development, mental well-being, life opportunities,
relationships, capacity for self-governance, and even our environment. A
myopic approach prioritizing individuals’ (often illusory) choices obscures these
larger, collective harms. An approach to data loyalty that required fealty only to
individual choice would doom us to the same fate. Not only must any data
loyalty framework explicitly exist alongside deeper, structural, collective
changes imposed by public governance, but also any determination of people’s
“best interests” must include a consideration of the common good. Notice,
choice, and consent regimes, and even more demanding individualistic, harmbased regimes are only peripherally concerned with systemic, collective harms,
if at all. Zeynep Tufecki explains helpfully that “[d]ata privacy is not like a
consumer good, where you click ‘I accept’ and all is well. [It] is more like air
quality or safe drinking water, a public good that cannot be effectively regulated
by trusting in the wisdom of millions of individual choices.”93 People aren’t
93

Zeynep Tufecki, The Latest Data Privacy Debacle, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
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generally motivated to consider collective risks or risks to vulnerable groups that
they are not a part of when giving consent to data practices, any more than people
who might “choose not to wear a mask” as permitted by law during a pandemic
might consider the public health consequences. Framing things in individual
rights terms can cause us to miss the public and social consequences of our
actions.94
Along similar lines, a properly crafted duty of loyalty would also help free
privacy law from its overly individualistic focus by protecting against systemic
harms felt by entire groups, given the scale on which platforms operate.95 One
way to do this, while simultaneously resolving the problem of billions of
possibly divergent “best interests,” is for lawmakers to specifically prioritize
interests that are held collectively by groups of customers, with certain
individually held interests holding sway only to the extent they do not conflict
with collective user interests.96 Thus, while there will inevitably be (as is often
the case in law) hard cases at the margins, the claim that data loyalty conflicts
with other duties is not just incorrect but also points to the surprising virtue that
loyalty duties promote human values in all their complexity.
IV. LOYALTY CAN BE BOTH FLEXIBLE AND CLEAR
Of all the objections to a duty of loyalty for privacy law, the most frequent
and prominent is that the duty is just too vague.97 In a hearing on the future of
transatlantic data flows called by the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, Senator Wicker asked of a panelist who advocated
for a duty of loyalty in privacy law, “Where is there a working duty of loyalty
in place in law somewhere that we can look to[?] . . . When we’re able to be
specific in those instances, then we’re getting somewhere. But beyond that, it’s
hard actually to define [a duty of loyalty.]”98 James Grimmelmann also suggests
com/2018/01/30/opinion/strava-privacy.html.
94
See RICHARDS, supra note 64, at 77–78; see also Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, The
Inconsentability of Facial Surveillance, 66 LOY. L. REV. 33, 42 (2020) (exploring how individually-motivated
“informed consent” regimes fail to adequately protect vulnerable and marginalized groups).
95
See Julie E. Cohen, Scaling Trust and Other Fictions, supra note 5.
96
Gold, supra note 90, at 385, 390, 398 (discussing the hierarchy of obligations approach to how
“common shares might ordinarily benefit from fiduciary obligations while preferred shares will only benefit in
exceptional circumstances”).
97
Grimmelmann, supra note 10.
98
The Invalidation of the EU-US Privacy Shield and the Future of Transatlantic Data Flows: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci. & Transp., 116th Cong. (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.commerce.senate.gov/
2020/12/the-invalidation-of-the-eu-us-privacy-shield-and-the-future-of-transatlantic-data-flows (statement of
Sen. Wicker at 2:05:42–02:07:48). Senator Wicker is the sponsor of one of the most prominent proposals for an
omnibus federal privacy law in the United States. The Senator actually expressed tentative support for a duty of
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that when applied to digital platforms, it becomes clear that “the rule against
self-dealing is either absurdly under-inclusive, absurdly over-inclusive, or
both.”99 More generally, when the topic of data loyalty comes up even in casual
conversation, people often express skepticism over a duty of loyalty because
they view it as remarkably vague.100
There are three different versions of this critique. First, if the duty is
interpreted too broadly, it could prove unduly burdensome and costly to
businesses.101 Second, the indeterminacy of a duty of loyalty creates room for
companies to interpret their obligations in their weakest possible form, watering
them down to mere compliance exercises with little protection for people and
little hope for changing incentives for abuse.102 Third, if a duty of loyalty isn’t
clarified, then companies might be left with no clue about what kinds of conduct
are prohibited and what data practices and design choices are permissible.103
Once again, this is a form of the Goldilocks Problem–it’s too hot, it’s too cold,
or even if it’s just right, it’s still a bowl of mush.
We understand the impulses behind these arguments. Robust rules inevitably
come with high compliance costs. Companies have a long history of exploiting
the indeterminacy of privacy rules to their advantage and fighting for rules that
allow for threadbare compliance without meaningful accountability.104 They
will undoubtedly try to do the same for a duty of loyalty. And courts have taken
an interest in ensuring companies have proper notice of what is expected of them
from privacy rules.105 But we think all three concerns around vagueness can be
meaningfully addressed with a properly articulated duty of loyalty.
loyalty, even though such a duty does not explicitly appear in the bill he sponsored. And in full disclosure, the
panelist was one of the authors of this Article. Also, thank you for reading so deeply in our paper—and its
footnotes.
99
Grimmelmann, supra note 10.
100
See @JulesPolonetsky, TWITTER (Mar. 23, 2021, 11:30 PM), https://twitter.com/JulesPolonetsky/
status/1374564164568559616?s=20 (“Due to years of regulation, we know what fiduciary means in other
sectors. Do we know what exactly what a browser fiduciary should do with ads/tracking? Block all ads, if user
wishes or surveys of users support?”).
101
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 3 (manuscript at 63–64).
102
Id. at 64.
103
Id. at 64–65.
104
See Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Practice, and Performance, 110 CALIF. L. REV. (manuscript at 18–
19) (forthcoming 2022) [hereinafter Waldman, Privacy]; ARI EZRA WALDMAN, INDUSTRY UNBOUND: THE
INSIDE STORY OF PRIVACY, DATA, AND CORPORATE POWER (2021) [hereinafter WALDMAN, INDUSTRY
UNBOUND].
105
See LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 894 F.3d 1221, 1237 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that an FTC
cease and desist order was unenforceable because it “[did] not enjoin a specific act or practice” about how to
accomplish an overhaul of a data security program); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799
F.3d 236, 255 (3d Cir. 2015) (concluding that the applicable FTC cybersecurity standard was precise enough to
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This reveals a final surprising virtue of data loyalty: its flexibility, which is
just like the flexibility of other standards-based frameworks like negligence,
unfairness, Fourth Amendment reasonableness, and legitimate interests.
Because of this flexibility, a duty of loyalty can be responsive to bigger structural
power concerns and emergent problems driven by the affordances of new
tools.106 Data loyalty is not in opposition to robust public governance
approaches; it can be a complement to public governance, serving as a catchall
to keep things from falling through the cracks. As we discuss below, loyalty is
typically implemented on two separate levels. The first, more general level is a
broad duty applying to all interactions within an information relationship. The
second, more specific level is through the articulation of detailed and substantive
subsidiary rules. This second level targets particular contexts and actions that
provide clear rules and less wiggle room, to ensure accountability and keep the
frameworks from becoming watered down.
A. “Best Interests” Standard Clarified by Specific Rules
Of course, organizations will inevitably try to dilute the effectiveness of
privacy rules. Ari Waldman has detailed the many different ways that
organizations leverage the substance and structure of privacy law and the
lawmaking process to lower the costs of regulation on their business model.107
But a two-tiered duty of loyalty that features flexible general standards and
context-specific rules would appear to be more resistant to sabotage and cooption than either specific rules or broad duties would be in isolation.108 The
layered structure of data loyalty, combined with the fact that loyalty is amenable
to robust enforcement mechanisms like private causes of action and equity
interventions like disgorgement, injunctions, and estoppel, make it more likely
to have bite, as well as provide ample opportunities for broad standards to
become refined, just like negligence has over time.

inform the relevant inquiry to be carried out by the company).
106
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 3 (manuscript at 39) (discussing structural power concerns).
107
See WALDMAN, INDUSTRY UNBOUND, supra note 104, at 99–160; Waldman, Privacy, supra note 104,
at 12–33.
108
Robert H. Sitkoff, Other Fiduciary Duties: Implementing Loyalty and Care, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 419, 421 (Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2019) (“[B]y making use of an integrated
mix of overlapping open-ended standards, more specific standards, and rules, fiduciary law improves upon the
familiar trope of rules versus standards as competing governance strategies. . . . Fiduciary law’s combination of
the primary duties of loyalty and care (open-ended standards) plus specific subsidiary duties (more specific
standards and rules) provides the flexibility of standards plus the specification of rules while minimizing their
respective disadvantages.”).
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Over time, all standards creep towards rules, and a duty of loyalty for privacy
law would be no different. Standards like the FTC’s unfairness authority or the
“reasonable expectation of privacy” component of the Fourth Amendment cover
a wide range of possible behaviors but over time have come to target very
specific kinds of behavior such as pretexting, dangerous data security practices,
wiretapping, and other kinds of surreptitious surveillance.109 A duty of loyalty
in privacy law would require work and tending, but that is true of all meaningful
legal principles. We also note in passing that the FTC’s unfairness authority and
the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures might
be the two most important principles in U.S. privacy law—despite the fact that
both are over a century old.
However, the virtues of standards do not obviate the need for clear subsidiary
rules. A general standard like a prohibition on conflicted self-dealing can serve
as a catchall, but clear rules are required to hold organizations accountable and
make rules implementable. They can also single out particularly egregious
examples of disloyal conduct to make them clearly prohibited, as the canons of
legal ethics do in prohibiting commingling client funds, making business deals
with clients, and even having sex with clients. All of these are disloyal, but our
canons of ethics mark them out as forbidden just to be clear.110 We also
emphatically agree with Julie Cohen’s claim that “while problems of trust and
market domination each undeniably contribute to the dysfunctions that
surveillance-based business models create, responding adequately to those
dysfunctions requires moving beyond reactive conceptions of data protection
toward a governance model organized around problems of design, networked
flow, and scale.”111 Cohen argued that a meaningful privacy framework should
be “framed in terms of concrete requirements that must be satisfied by firms
collecting, processing, and exchanging personal information.”112
To clarify a duty of loyalty for privacy law, lawmakers should limit the duty
to the extent of people’s exposure and provide for the creation of specific
subsidiary rules containing the concrete requirements called for by Cohen and
others.113 In our previous work on trust, we have defined the concept of trust as
the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to the actions of others.114 As a key
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Richards & Hartzog, supra note 3 (manuscript at 44, 64).
See Anthony E. Davis & Judith Grimaldi, Sexual Confusion: Attorney-Client Sex and the Need for a
Clear Ethical Rule, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 57 (1993).
111
COHEN, HOW (NOT) TO WRITE A PRIVACY LAW, supra note 5, at 13.
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See, e.g., id.; Waldman, Privacy, supra note 104.
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Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
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component of trust, our duty of loyalty would be properly limited to the extent
of that vulnerability. To determine the extent of people’s exposure, we must
examine what is entrusted to companies that collect people’s data: people’s data
and their mediated experiences. These concepts require a little explanation.115
When people expose themselves to organizations through modern, powerful
digital technologies, they entrust more than just discrete pieces of information.
It is not as simple as merely giving your phone number to the cashier at Best
Buy. For such atomized transactions, we might simply hew to a purpose
limitation rule and prohibit using the number for things like robocalls, spam
marketing, or using your number as a universal ID through which to hand over
all sorts of other information about you. Given the jaw-dropping quantity and
quality of information that can be extracted through modern apps and websites,
people expose their narratives and identities to those services. In the process,
they can endanger their individual and collective well-being by empowering
trusted parties and their “partners” to gain knowledge about them, judge them,
make decisions affecting them, and exert power over them in ways that that are
contrary to their best interests. So, the relevant question for organizations bound
by a duty of loyalty would be what the affordances are of the data entrusted to
them.116 In other words, what actions do the data make significantly easier or
harder? Data systems lower the cost of information storage, search, and delivery.
This makes every choice to create data a moral act. Loyalty would demand that
organizations refrain from acting upon an affordance of the data that conflicts
with a reasonable trusting party’s best interests.
Similarly, those entrusted with people’s mediated experiences should look
to the affordances of mediated technologies to determine the scope of their
loyalty obligations. All of our experiences online are mediated by the company
whose services we are using. That company chooses what we see, what we can
click, and what we expose and determines how, when, and where that
information is viewed. When people use a website or app, they are entrusting
things of value to companies that can be easily taken advantage of, including

431, 433 (2016).
115
See Richard S. Whitt, Old School Goes Online: Exploring Fiduciary Obligations of Loyalty and Care
in the Digital Platforms Era, 36 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 75, 89 (2019) (“So, the ‘what’ of fiduciary
power extends to information derived from the underlying relationship. . . . ‘[R]elational knowledge’—special
information that fiduciaries acquire about their beneficiaries—is key to the economic logic and the law
supporting these relationships.”).
116
For more information on affordances, see, for example, James J. Gibson, The Theory of Affordances,
in PERCEIVING, ACTING, AND KNOWING: TOWARD AN ECOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 67, 67–72, 76 (Robert Shaw &
John Bransford eds., 1977).
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their attention, their labor, and their time.117 While structures in the physical
world are routinely leveraged against people in extractive and manipulative
ways (like the placement of eggs in the back of the supermarket), modern
platform designers have distinctly more power over people interacting in the
digitally mediated environments they create.118 In pre-structured, mediated
environments, there is no improvisation. You click the buttons and fill in the text
boxes that you are given, or you get out. Mediated environments are
astonishingly opaque because device screens have limited viewing space and
there are no physical constraints limiting what happens behind the curtains.
People cannot see all the options available, only what is presented, and they
often do not understand how or why what is on their screen came to be there or
that different people using the same service are seeing different things. Platforms
have massive incentives to extract labor and data and the ability to change and
optimize design on the fly to keep you engaged.
Ryan Calo argues that “society is only beginning to understand how vast
asymmetries of information coupled with the unilateral power to design the legal
and visual terms of the transaction could alter the consumer landscape.”119 Calo
identifies three phenomena of what he calls “digital market manipulation,” all
intimately related to data, that supercharged the potential for abuse in online
markets: (1) the “mass production of bias” through big data, (2) the possibility
of far greater consumer intelligence through “disclosure ratcheting,” and (3) the
move from ends-based to means-based ad targeting and interface design.120
Thus, when it comes to digital environments, it is not as simple as grocery
stores putting the milk at the back of the building to force you to walk through
the whole store, which will increase the odds of an impulse purchase. For such
localized and static tactics, we might simply hew to the rule against unfair and
deceptive trade practices to keep stores honest and people safe while allowing
for optimized choice architecture, even if it is slightly extractive and slightly
coercive. But modern platforms can use the affordances of digital tools to extract
so much data, attention, and labor from people; these tools endanger people’s
individual and collective well-being by empowering trusted parties to have
complete control over what they see, what they can click, and what they can
accomplish online. So, the relevant question for organizations bound by a duty
of loyalty is what are the affordances of specific user interfaces? In other words,
117
See, e.g., ALICE MARWICK, THE PRIVATE IS POLITICAL: NETWORKED PRIVACY
(forthcoming) (including a discussion on the concept of “privacy work”).
118
HARTZOG, supra note 39; Calo, supra note 43, at 1006–07.
119
Calo, supra note 43, at 1006–07.
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what outcomes do specific design choices make significantly more or less
likely? Design choices accomplish two things: they convey signals and make
tasks easier or harder. Every technological design choice makes a certain reality
more or less likely, which makes every design choice a moral act. Loyalty would
demand that organizations refrain from design choices that foreseeably extract
data, labor, or attention from trusting parties or prey on trusting parties’ limited
resources or cognition for coercive purposes that conflict with a trusting party’s
best interests.
Lawmakers could conceptualize the “best interests” of trusting parties in
several different ways. Andrew Gold explains that when the law centers “best
interests” around human well-being, “attending to someone’s best interests is
not easily reducible to a simple formula.”121 He notes, “We can focus on how a
person experiences her life, for example whether she is happy; we can focus on
whether she has been able to satisfy her preferences, whatever those may be; or,
we can focus on whether her life measures up well against some good or group
of goods that is considered valuable.”122 Gold comments that “quite possibly,
overall well-being involves some combination of success in each of these areas,
and the key question is the difficult question of how to weigh the different
components. Each individual theory has its proponents and detractors.”123 While
the general open-ended nature of what constitutes one’s best interest certainly
must be addressed, the flexibility of this standard provides room for lawmakers
to sufficiently tailor this duty to the contours of the relationship between people
and the organizations they trust with their data and online experiences.
We recommend two ways to limit what constitutes a person’s “best interests”
within the context of data loyalty. First, the “best interests” should be limited to
the interests affected by the entrustment of data and attention, instead of an
overall well-being standard. Organizations would be directed to ask which
interests were implicated by the affordances of the data and design of user
interfaces. So, while it might be disloyal for a company to design a system that
used trusting parties location data to allow pharmaceutical companies to target
them when they are currently in the hospital (and thus vulnerable), it would
probably not be disloyal for that company to generally allow pharmaceutical
companies to place advertisements on their app or website. Systems that allow
for such microtargeted advertising based on highly detailed profiles rather than

121
122
123

Andrew S. Gold, Purposive Loyalty, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 881, 899 (2017).
Id.
Id. at 894–95.

HARTZOGRICHARDS_5.20.22

1020

5/25/2022 1:45 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71

isolated contexts make exploitation of vulnerable parties easier and compound
incentives for companies to engineer exposure for financial gains.124
Second, although a virtue of loyalty is that it does not demand a strict
showing of harm (as we have seen, the violation is to the integrity of the
relationship), when considering ways an action can be adverse to the interests of
a trusting party, entrustees should look to the foreseeable dangers of exposure.125
A great place to start is the scholarly work identifying and explaining various
kinds of privacy harms by Danielle Citron, Daniel Solove, Ryan Calo, and
others.126
Another key aspect of loyalty is that, in conjunction with a duty of care, it
can animate a number of different broad subsidiary duties, such as duties of
candor, good faith, nondelegation of key services, and confidentiality.127 But,
once again, legislatures and courts often go further and create or delegate
authority for the creation of a series of clearer subsidiary obligations that are
more like rules than vague standards. Robert Sitkoff explains that “[t]he duties
of loyalty and care, which we might call the primary fiduciary duties, are
typically structured as broad, open-ended standards that speak generally.”128 He
notes that “[b]y contrast, the other fiduciary duties, which we might call the
subsidiary or implementing fiduciary duties, are typically structured as rules, or
at least as more specific standards that speak with greater specificity.”129
This two-tiered approach allows lawmakers to tailor rules to specific
relationships, allowing for the avoidance of specific foreseeable conduct while

124
Ariel Fox Johnson, Behavioral Ads Are Bad for Kids, COMMON SENSE (May 10, 2021), https://www.
commonsensemedia.org/kids-action/articles/behavioral-ads-are-bad-for-kids.
125
See, e.g., Lindsey Barrett, Confiding in Con Men: U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information
Fiduciaries, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1057, 1097 (2019) (“In addition to expanding the notion of legally
cognizable digital harms, an effective information fiduciary framework should expand the definition of what a
privacy harm is.”).
126
See, e.g., Citron & Solove, supra note 68, at 830–61 (breaking down privacy harms into physical,
economic, reputational, and emotional harms, and describing issues of chilling effects, discrimination, thwarted
expectations, control, data quality, informed choice, vulnerability, disturbance, and autonomy harms); M. Ryan
Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131 (2011).
127
See Whitt, supra note 115, at 94–95 (“Additional fiduciary obligations recognized by courts of equity
over many centuries include the duty of candor, duty of good faith, duty not to delegate the services to others,
and the duty of confidentiality. Typically they are subsumed as ‘subsidiary’ or ‘implementing’ obligations under
either the duty of care or of loyalty. However, in some legal quarters the duty of confidentiality has been deemed
an important supportive component of the ‘primary’ fiduciary duties. . . . [T]he duty of confidentiality deserves
special status in the digital environment as an ‘enabling’ obligation that strengthens the more well-established
fiduciary duties of care and of loyalty.”).
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Sitkoff, supra note 108, at 419.
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maintaining flexibility for new and changed rules in the future.130 As applied to
privacy law, it would allow lawmakers to target large platforms or social media
companies that presented specific problems of gatekeeping for third parties or
self-dealing due to two-way markets without applying the same specific rules to
traditional e-commerce or media streaming companies bound by a general duty
of loyalty. Companies not bound by specific subsidiary rules would still be
bound by a general duty of loyalty.
A look at duties of loyalty in other contexts can help shed some light on how
such a duty might be conceptualized in privacy law. For example, a
Massachusetts law laying out the duties of a guardian ad litem requires that a
guardian “shall act at all times in the ward’s best interest and exercise reasonable
care, diligence and prudence.”131 California law provides that “[t]he trustee has
a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.”132 A
similar prohibition could be articulated for a duty of loyalty in positive terms
(hypothetically, “a covered entity must act at all times in the trusting parties’
best interests regarding their data”) or in terms of a “no-conflict” rule (for
example, “a covered entity shall be prohibited from taking any actions with
respect to processing data or designing user interfaces that conflict with trusting
parties’ best interests.”).
Enacting legislation should also either provide for subsidiary duties or
delegate rulemaking authority to entities like the FTC for future subsidiary rules.
Looking to the content of subsidiary duties in other contexts might be helpful
for lawmakers enacting rules for data loyalty. In areas like agency law, the duty
of loyalty has been built out with more specific subsidiary duties governing
“self-dealing, material benefit, competition with the principal, and use of the
principal’s property.”133 In the law of trusts, subsidiary loyalty and care duties
include administering the trust according to its terms but petitioning the court if
doing so would harm the beneficiaries, collecting and protecting the trust
property and keeping it separate from other properties, extensive record-keeping

130
Sitkoff gives the prudent investor rule as an example of how subsidiary rules develop in trust law. Id.
at 420–21 (“Structurally, the prudent investor rule is an elaborated standard that, by focusing on risk-and-return
and diversification, gives specific content to the open-ended, primary duty of care, called prudence in trust
parlance, as applied to the investment function of trusteeship. . . . [W]ithin the fiduciary fields that do include an
investment function, the prudent investor rule encompasses the accumulated learning on what the duty of care
requires in fiduciary investment. In consequence, rather than start from scratch in every fiduciary investment
matter, fiduciaries, beneficiaries, and courts may look to the elaboration with the prudent investor rule to discern
the application of a duty of care.”).
131
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-209(a) (2010).
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CAL. PROB. CODE § 16002 (West 2010).
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and disclosure requirements, duties to bring and defend claims to the trust, and
a duty to be cost-sensitive in the administration of the trust.134 In corporate law,
subsidiary fiduciary duties address issues like the usurpation of corporate
opportunity, management’s role during contests for corporate control, actions
that might impair the efficacy of shareholder voting or meetings, the need for
internal monitoring and compliance, and requires to disclosure information to
shareholders.135 Nonprofit law includes subsidiary fiduciary obligations such as
accounting for profits, rules against competition and usuring opportunities,
prudent investment requirements, and rules against private inurement.136
Bankruptcy, investment advice, and employment law impose similar subsidiary
duties regarding accounting for property and profits, prudence, and noncompetition.137 For lawyers, as we have seen, subsidiary duties elaborate on the
general duty of loyalty to address conflicts of interest, confidentiality,
identification of and communication with clients, and familiarity with client
affairs.138 In health care, subsidiary fiduciary duties apply safeguarding client
confidences, informed consent, and conflicts of interests.139 Even public
fiduciary law has built out the duty of loyalty with subsidiary obligations. The
Emoluments Clauses of the U.S. Constitution are, in effect, loyalty rules, as are
conflict of interest, disclosure, and antibias rules for judges and prohibitions
under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations on diplomats to refrain
from commercial activity abroad for personal profit.140
For privacy law, subsidiary data loyalty rules might look like tailored
versions of non-privacy fiduciary duties such as disclosure of material facts,
consent, accounting for property (access and portability rights), confidentiality,
and the full suite of the FIPS. This could apply some of the most significant
obligations compelled by the GDPR. A duty of loyalty, combined with a duty of
care, could help effectuate the most robust versions of existing data privacy
rules—such as data minimization, purpose limitation, and legitimate basis for
processing requirements—bound together and safeguarded by an anti-betrayal
ethos.
Since deference to the data subjects’ interests is also central to data
protection regimes and rules requiring disclosure, and accounting and record-
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keeping requirements are designed to hold trusted parties accountable for loyal
behavior, a duty of loyalty would be an effective mechanism to animate the best
of data protection frameworks. Loyal and careful organizations also do not take
advantage of their superior position to lie to or harm those that trust them. So,
heightened prohibitions against unfair and deceptive conduct would also make
strong subsidiary duties.
Lawmakers need not stop there. One of the most important subsidiary duties
to stem opportunistic behavior would be a robust prohibition on abusive trade
practices. As we have detailed in prior work, companies turning people’s own
cognitive and resource limitations against them to wrongfully extract data and
labor is an endemic problem online.141 Subsidiary rules prohibiting abusive trade
practices would prohibit entrustees from materially interfering with the ability
of trusting parties to understand the terms of the relationship and lower the risk
associated with exposure and engagement. Rules against abuse would also
prohibit entrustees from taking unreasonable advantage of a trusting party’s lack
of understanding about the material risks, costs, or conditions of the service or
the inability of trusting parties to protect their interests within the relationship.
Finally, anti-abuse rules could prohibit entrustees from taking unreasonable
advantage of the reasonable reliance by trusting parties on an entrustee’s
representation to act in the trusting party’s interests.
Lawmakers might also consider rigid prohibitions on specific practices, like
the deployment of unreasonably dangerous automated tools or the use of
personal data to train those automated systems. They could create subsidiary
rules for inherently dangerous practices and technologies that, at the systemic
level, are in fundamental conflict with the best interests of trusting parties, such
as microtargeting (a practice that paves the way for third party abuse and
imposes more externalities than benefits for trusting parties) or affect
recognition (the use of machines to read emotional states so as to enhance
technology-based persuasion).142 Lawmakers could craft even more rules
designed for specific parties, such as a rule that “social media platforms may not
deploy affect recognition technologies on photos or videos submitted by trusting
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Richards & Hartzog, supra note 114, at 470–71.
For an exploration of the dangers of affect recognition systems, see, e.g., KATE CRAWFORD, ATLAS OF
AI: POWER, POLITICS, AND THE PLANETARY COSTS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 176–79 (2021); Kate Crawford,
Artificial Intelligence Is Misreading Human Emotion, ATLANTIC (Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2021/04/artificial-intelligence-misreading-human-emotion/618696/; Luke Stark & Jesse
Hoey, The Ethics of Emotion in Artificial Intelligence Systems, in FACCT ‘21: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2021 ACM
CONFERENCE ON FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 782, 787–88 (2021), https://doi.org/10.
1145/3442188.3445939.
142

HARTZOGRICHARDS_5.20.22

1024

5/25/2022 1:45 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71

parties.” There might be disclosure mandates, process requirements,
prohibitions on conduct, or obligated tasks. But fundamentally, each such rule
should target specific areas where trusted parties have an incentive to engage in
self-dealing.143
Lawmakers could, of course, impose all these rules even without couching
them within an umbrella duty of loyalty. We have proposed in previous research
that trust-building and trust-enforcing rules could be meaningful complements
or the next best thing to broad and strong relational obligations.144 Many of these
rules, such as generally applicable data protection obligations, should have
sibling rules that apply regardless of whether data controllers are in an
information relationship with a trusting party. But we believe, as argued in Part
I, that a duty of loyalty would act as an important animating force, interpretive
guide, and catchall provision to bring more coherence, flexibility, and
accountability through enforcement than these rules would as standalone laws.
Lawmakers also could create subsidiary rules built around wrongful gains
by companies, as opposed to rules focused on harm to individuals.145 This is
because loyalty is about mitigating the lopsided power advantage certain trusted
parties have that gives them both significant incentives and abilities for wrongful
self-dealing. While the ultimate goal is to prevent outcomes adverse to the
trusting party, the direct goal of a duty of loyalty is to preserve the integrity and
reliability of relationships of trust by short-circuiting through law the ability of
powerful parties to take wrongful advantage of their dominant position.
B. Five Areas for Subsidiary Data Loyalty Rules
Scholars and lawmakers have identified a number of different contexts
where the incentives for self-dealing by the powerful party in an information
relationship are overwhelming, making these contexts particularly suitable for
subsidiary data loyalty rules.146 In this section, we synthesize these contexts into
143
See Gold, supra note 90, at 401 (“Different opportunism risks will then justify different loyalty content
and approaches to legal decision-making.”).
144
Richards & Hartzog, supra note 114, at 435–36.
145
See, e.g., Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Remedies, 94 IND. L.J. 653, 659, 677–78 (2019) (arguing for
restitution as the best fit for privacy infringement).
146
See, e.g., Balkin, Fiduciary Model of Privacy, supra note 3, at 15 (“The nature of fiduciary obligations
depends on . . . the potential dangers of abuse, manipulation, self-dealing, and overreaching by the more
powerful party.”); Scholz, supra note 3, at 197; Ariel Dobkin, Information Fiduciaries in Practice: Data Privacy
and User Expectations, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 17 (2018) (identifying four major ways of breaching an
information fiduciary duty: “manipulation, discrimination, third-party sharing, and violating a company’s own
privacy policy”); Barrett, supra note 125, at 1100 (“[A]n information fiduciary framework should also address
manipulation and discrimination in order to ensure that people are protected from the full array of modern digital
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five main areas to provide even more specificity to the kinds of subsidiary rules
that could give protection to those contexts that are the ripest for abuse. First,
entrustees should be loyal when collecting information. Even in relationships of
trust, data should only be collected when it is in the best interests of trusting
parties. Second, entrustees should be loyal when personalizing (i.e., treating
people differently based upon personal information or characteristics). Third,
entrustees should be loyal when gatekeeping, avoiding conflicts when allowing
government and other third-party access to trusting parties and their data. Fourth,
entrustees should be loyal when influencing trusting parties, such as when they
leverage personal data and digital tools to exert sway over people to achieve
particular results. Fifth and finally, entrustees should be loyal when mediating
interactions between their human customers, specifically in the creation and
administration of systems that govern how people are allowed to interact with
each other. These contexts often overlap and involve issues like discriminatory
microtargeting, harmful amplification of misinformation, failure of process for
content moderation, and abusive dark patterns. We propose that lawmakers
create an overlapping web of subsidiary loyalty rules to mitigate these kinds of
disloyal behavior.
1. Loyal Collection
A duty of loyalty should begin the moment a trusted party invites disclosure
and makes the decision to collect personal information. In this way, data loyalty
could embolden the fair information principle of data minimization. This
principle holds that data collectors should only identify the minimum amount of
personal information needed to fulfill a legitimate purpose and collection, and
hold that much information and no more.147 Combined with the storage
limitation principle, which holds that organizations should not keep data longer
than needed for their stated purpose, data minimization is a central pillar in data
protection regimes around the world, but it too often fails to find traction.148
Data loyalty could provide a normative vision for when companies have
exceeded their duty to minimize collection and retention—when it conflicts with
a trusting party’s (or collective trusting parties’) best interests. Under general

threats that they face.”).
147
Data Minimisation, INFO. COMM’RS OFF., https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/
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26, 2022).
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Use of Information?, GREENBERGTRAURIG (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.gtlaw-dataprivacydish.com/2020/10/
does-the-ccpa-require-data-minimization-with-regard-to-the-collection-and-use-of-information/.

HARTZOGRICHARDS_5.20.22

1026

5/25/2022 1:45 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 71

data protection frameworks that impose data minimization requirements,
organizations must typically ensure that the data they are processing is adequate
(sufficient to fulfill the stated purpose), relevant (has a relevant link to that
purpose), and necessary (collecting and holding only that which is needed for
that purpose). But there is a fair amount of uncertainty as to how to interpret
these requirements. The U.K. Information Commissioner’s Office explains that
“[t]he UK GDPR does not define [what is adequate, relevant, and limited].
Clearly, though, this will depend on your specified purpose for collecting and
using the personal data. It may also differ from one individual to another.”149 A
duty of loyalty could provide a value-laden baseline that not only requires an
examination of the purpose of the collection but also elevates the interests of
those affected by the collection. It is likely that more data of specific kinds or in
specific contexts might be collected within trusted relationships than would
otherwise be acceptable for parties outside of information relationships, but this
collection should come with much stricter obligations. Of course, loyal
collection also means that trusted parties must often refrain from collecting
entire kinds of information. While parties at arm’s length might act
opportunistically in collecting as much data as possible, trusted parties remain
loyal by leaving all data that does not serve trusting parties’ best interests on the
table. Moreover, to the extent that we might be concerned about the later stages
of Zuboff’s theory of surveillance capitalism, in which data are collected to
predict and persuade, a robust regime of loyal collection would ensure that we
remain only at the first stage, in which data are collected to improve the quality
of service in the loyal customer’s interest.150
2. Loyal Personalization
The modern Internet routinely and systemically treats people differently
based upon their personal information or characteristics. Targeted and
behavioral advertising are the most infamous examples of this, but first-party
product and streaming recommendations, news feeds, default settings, layouts,
and more are all designed to automatically look and act differently based on a
person’s personal characteristics. Some of this personalization, such as targeted
recommendations for networked connections based upon intentionally revealed
data (for example, where you work or attended high school), would probably be
loyal. Other personalization systems, however, such as those that wrongfully
discriminate or have a disparate impact on protected, marginalized, or vulnerable
groups of people, would likely conflict with that trusting collective’s best
149
150

Data Minimisation, supra note 147.
See Richards & Hartzog, supra note 3 (manuscript at 13).
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interests. Ariel Dobkin argues in favor of antidiscrimination rules for those
bound by duties of loyalty and care, which would prohibit companies in
information relationships from “discriminating between or against users based
on characteristics like race or gender.”151 Dobkin adds that “[t]he set of data
points available to companies often includes these qualities and many others.
There are three main methods by which a company might discriminate based on
these characteristics: (1) access to services, (2) prices, and (3) digital
redlining.”152
Some fear that rules requiring loyal personalization might jeopardize the
entire enterprise of targeted and behavioral advertising. However, such fears are
overblown. Balkin responds to this concern: “This conclusion does not follow
unless we assume that all targeted advertising is inherently abusive and
inconsistent with the best interests of end users. Since much of modern
advertising is based on increasing efficiencies in locating and reaching interested
audiences, this would be a very surprising conclusion.”153 Instead, Balkin
argues, “[W]e should ask what practices of advertising, targeted at end users, do
not betray their trust or operate against their interests. Only this kind of targeted
advertising should be permitted.”154
We agree with Balkin and would save the existential debate around targeted
advertising for a different day. Our point here is merely to emphasize that
subsidiary rules built around the concept of loyal personalization could firmly
and clearly address a systemic problem that traditional data protection
frameworks have been unable to solve.
3. Loyal Gatekeeping
Entrustees have a remarkable ability to give third parties access to trusting
parties and their data. They can do so through their APIs, advertiser portals,
fusion centers, and government backdoors. This access is the source of most
major platforms’ power. And everyone wants a piece of the “users.” Advertisers
clamor for their attention. Data brokers and companies training AI models lust
for their data. And governments demand evidence for investigations, trials, and
intelligence. Entrustees have financial incentives to build portals and facilitate
151

Dobkin, supra note 146, at 26.
Id.
153
Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, supra note 3, at 27.
154
Id. at 28 (“A rule that allowed only contextual targeted advertising but not behavioral advertising
would, at a stroke, transform the landscape of surveillance capitalism, but it would still allow targeted ads . . . .
How companies engage in behavioral advertising depends on background legal restrictions on collection and
use.”).
152
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access for third parties. Some access granted by trustees to third parties is not in
conflict with trusting parties’ best interests. For example, contextual advertising
usually does not significantly turn people’s own data or limitations against them,
nor does it usually expose trusting parties to significant privacy harms. Protocols
for interoperability to help people transfer data from one place to another also
serve the interests (and often the wishes) of trusting parties.
However, certain lax gatekeeping practices would be disloyal because of
how they endanger trusting parties by obscuring risk and breaking promises
while facilitating access to third parties for organizational gains or to avoid costs.
The three most resonant privacy scandals in the past decade—the government
surveillance revelations by Edward Snowden, the FBI’s request that Apple help
them bypass encryption protections, and Cambridge Analytica’s massive
Facebook data exfiltration—all involved gatekeeping issues.155 Facebook’s
system for facilitating third-party applications’ access to their customer base was
a clear example of making collective user interests subservient to growth
metrics, as the company touted to its human customers the virtues of being able
to control their audiences while obscuring the true risk of exposure and the steps
needed to limit it.156 Similarly, although companies typically have little choice
in respecting legal process compelling customer data, a duty of loyalty would
justify rules that mandated additional process for certain kinds of
relationships.157 Kiel Brennan-Marquez argues the following:
Fourth Amendment doctrine must abandon the pretense that all private
actors are alike. The implication of A’s decision to share information
with B should not be uniform across contexts. Rather, it should depend
on what type of “third party” B is, on B’s role in the world vis-à-vis A.
In many settings, it is perfectly acceptable—indeed, it serves an
important public function—for B to help investigate A’s illicit activity.
155
Kennedy Elliott & Terri Rupar, Six Months of Revelations on NSA, WASH. POST (June 5-6, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/nsa-timeline/m/; The Cambridge Analytica Files,
GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/cambridge-analytica-files (last visited Apr. 26, 2022);
Arjun Kharpal, Apple v. FBI: All You Need to Know, CNBC (Mar. 29, 2016, 6:34 AM); https://www.cnbc.com/
2016/03/29/apple-vs-fbi-all-you-need-to-know.html.
156
FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on Facebook, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (July 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penaltysweeping-new-privacy-restrictions.
157
See, e.g., Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, supra note 3, at 19 (“Under the fiduciary model, the
question is not whether consumers reasonably expect that a particular type of data will be kept private. Rather,
the question is whether the relationship between end users and digital companies is a fiduciary relationship of
trust. If so, then the question becomes whether the digital business can freely disclose this information to others
consistent with their fiduciary obligations. If not, then the government needs to obtain a warrant. The fiduciary
model helps preserve our security from the government as we hand over more and more information about
ourselves to digital businesses.”).
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But there is also an important class of cases in which B is not a run-ofthe-mill private actor, but rather an information fiduciary, beholden to
A’s interests first and foremost.158

In these ways, a duty of loyal gatekeeping could help reduce the exposure of
customers to third parties who would almost certainly not have their best
interests at heart. And a requirement that a loyal entrustee make sure that the
trusting party is protected from third-party access in the entrustee’s control
would be both well within the heartland of a duty of loyalty and also important
enough to safeguard through subsidiary rules.
4. Loyal Influencing
Technologies are artifacts built to act upon the world. Every conscious
design decision made in the creation of a website or app is meant to facilitate a
particular kind of behavior.159 In addressing the ethics of “nudging,” Cass
Sunstein explains the following:
When people make decisions, they do so against a background
consisting of choice architecture. A cafeteria has a design, and the
design will affect what people choose [to eat]. The same is true of
websites. Department stores have architectures, and they can be
designed so as to promote or discourage certain choices by shoppers
(such as leaving without making a purchase).160

The structure of digital technologies affects people’s choices even if the effect
is not intended by designers. When designers create drop-down menus, privacy
settings, “I agree” buttons, and other features that implicate privacy, they
influence people’s behavior. They can’t avoid it.161 Given their power, interface
designers and other choice architects should be loyal in exercising their
influence.
The most prominent example of disloyal influence involves organizations
leveraging “dark patterns” or “malicious interfaces,” which are user interface
elements meant to influence a person’s behavior against their intentions or best
158

Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 616 (2015).
Cf. LANGDON WINNER, THE WHALE AND THE REACTOR: A SEARCH FOR LIMITS IN AN AGE OF
TECHNOLOGY 124 (1986) (explaining the politics of artifacts).
160
Cass R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging, 32 YALE J. REGUL. 413, 417 (2015).
161
Id. at 421 (“Human beings . . . cannot wish [choice architecture] away. Any store has a design; some
products are seen first, and others are not. Any menu places options at various locations. Television stations
come with different numbers, and strikingly, numbers matter, even when the costs of switching are vanishingly
low; people tend to choose the station at the lower number, so that channel 3 will obtain more viewers than
channel 53.”).
159
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interests.162 Companies deploy “effort traps” to make deleting an account
confusing and difficult. They make “cancel” buttons hard to see and press,
obscure important details in tiny fonts or walls of boilerplate, and leverage our
deeply-entrenched and empirically-validated overconfidence regarding risk,
deference for conformity, endowment effects, status quo bias, and other biases
and mental shortcuts to manipulate us to their ends. (“Are you sure you want to
delete and miss valuable offers? Your friends will also be so sad to see you go!”)
Jamie Luguri and Lior Strahilevitz recently published some of the first
comparative evidence quantifying the effectiveness of dark patterns. The
scholars explain that “dark patterns are strikingly effective in getting consumers
to do what they would not do when confronted with more neutral user
interfaces.”163 Luguri and Strahilevitz found that “[r]elatively mild dark patterns
more than doubled the percentage of consumers who signed up for a dubious
identity theft protection service, . . . and aggressive dark patterns nearly
quadrupled the percentage of consumers signing up. In social science terms, the
magnitudes of these treatment effects are enormous.”164

162
See, e.g., HARTZOG, supra note 39, at 161; Jamie Luguri & Lior Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark
Patterns, 13 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 43, 44 (2021); Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, supra note 43, at 1005–06;
Gregory Conti & Edward Sobiesk, Malicious Interfaces and Personalization’s Uninviting Future, IEEE SEC. &
PRIV., May–June 2009, at 72–73, http://www.rumint.org/gregconti/publications/j3pri.pdf; Johanna Gunawan,
David Choffnes, Woodrow Hartzog & Christo Wilson, Towards an Understanding of Dark Patterns Privacy
Harms, in CHI WORKSHOP, WHAT CAN CHI DO ABOUT DARK PATTERNS? 1, 1 (2021), https://
darkpatternsindesign.com/position-papers/; Harry Brignull, Dark Patterns: Deception vs. Honesty in UI Design,
A LIST APART (Nov. 1, 2011), https://alistapart.com/article/dark-patterns-deception-vs-honesty-in-ui-design/;
Colin M. Gray, Yubo Kou, Bryan Battles, Joseph Hoggatt & Austin L. Toombs, The Dark (Patterns) Side of UX
Design, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2018 CHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS, 1, 1, 8–
9 (2018), http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=3173574.3174108; Arunesh Mathur, Gunes Acar, Michael J.
Friedman, Elena Lucherini, Jonathan Mayer, Marshini Chetty & Arvind Narayanan, Dark Patterns at Scale:
Findings from a Crawl of 11K Shopping Websites, 3 PROC. ACM HUM-COMPUT. INTERACTIONS 1, 4 (2019);
Arunesh Mathur, Jonathan Mayer & Mihir Kshirsagar, What Makes a Dark Pattern . . . Dark? Design Attributes,
Normative Considerations, and Measurement Methods, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2018 CHI CONFERENCE ON
HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS, supra, at 1, 13, http://arxiv.org/abs/2101.04843; Christoph Bösch,
Benjamin Erb, Frank Kargl, Henning Kopp & Stefan Pfattheicher, Tales from the Dark Side: Privacy Dark
Strategies and Privacy Dark Patterns, 4 PROC. ON PRIV. ENHANCING TECHS. 237, 248–49 (2016); Ari Ezra
Waldman, Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and the “Privacy Paradox,” 31 CURRENT OP. PSYCH. 105, 105,
107–08 (2020).
163
Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 162, at 46 (emphasis omitted).
164
Id. They add, “We found that the most effective dark pattern strategies were hidden information
(smaller print in a less visually prominent location), obstruction (making users jump through unnecessary hoops
to reject a service), trick questions (intentionally confusing prompts), and social proof (efforts to generate a
bandwagon effect). Other effective strategies included loaded questions and making acceptance the default. . . .
In many cases, consumers exposed to dark patterns did not understand that they had signed up for a costly
service.” Id. at 47.
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These findings have important implications for lawmakers considering
subsidiary rules for dark patterns, particularly for a duty of loyalty. Luguri and
Strahilevitz found evidence that the robustness of dark patterns matters in a
powerfully counterintuitive way. As they explain, “aggressive dark patterns
generate a powerful customer backlash whereas mild dark patterns usually do
not. Therefore, counterintuitively, the strongest case for regulation and other
legal interventions concern subtle uses of dark patterns.”165 (This also,
incidentally, explains why Target’s subtle hiding of habit-inducing baby formula
coupons in marketing to women it knew to be pregnant to avoid tipping them
off was both effective and problematic.166) Legal remedies that require
demonstrable injury, such as duties of care and prohibitions on unfair trade
practices, will likely struggle to redress the more subtle forms of manipulation
that Luguri and Strahilevitz highlighted as the most dangerous and profitable for
companies. Lawmakers, after all, have struggled for years to articulate when
attempts at persuasion become harmful.167
But trusting parties do not need to be injured for entrustees to violate a duty
of loyalty. Subsidiary rules around disloyal attempts to influence would address
the most pernicious and dangerous dark patterns head-on.168 Lawmakers should
focus on how the design (plus data science plus behavioral science) is meant to
take advantage of a person’s limitations or vulnerabilities to benefit the designer
in a way that is against the trusting party’s best interests.169

165

Id. at 46–47.
See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
167
See Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 162, at 99–102 (analyzing constitutional issues presented by dark
pattern regulation); see also Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation: Hidden
Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 3 (2019) (“[A]t its core, manipulation is hidden
influence—the covert subversion of another person’s decision-making power. In contrast with persuasion, which
is the forthright appeal to another person’s decision-making power, or coercion, which is the restriction of
acceptable options from which another person might choose, manipulation functions by exploiting the
manipulee’s cognitive (or affective) weaknesses and vulnerabilities in order to steer his or her decision-making
process towards the manipulator’s ends.”).
168
Luguri and Strahilevitz recommend a multi-factor test to help determine when dark patterns cross the
line that looks to considerations such as “(i) evidence of a defendant’s malicious intent or knowledge of
detrimental aspects of the user interface’s design, (ii) whether vulnerable populations—like less educated
consumers, the elderly, or people suffering from chronic medical conditions—are particularly susceptible to the
dark pattern, and (iii) the magnitude of the costs and benefits produced by the dark pattern.” Luguri &
Strahilevitz, supra note 162, at 99.
169
Balkin has proposed looking to “techniques of persuasion and influence that (1) prey on another
person’s emotional vulnerabilities and lack of knowledge (2) to benefit oneself or one’s allies and (3) reduce the
welfare of the other person.” Jack M. Balkin, Fixing Social Media’s Grand Bargain 4 (Hoover Working Grp.
on Nat’l Sec., Tech, & L., Aegis Series Paper No. 1814, 2018), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/
research/docs/balkin_webreadypdf.pdf.
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5. Loyal Mediation
Certain kinds of organizations design their platforms so that their customers
interact not just with the organization itself but also with each other. In other
words, they mediate people’s social and market experiences with other people
using their service. Often, the interests of the platforms and their customers do
not diverge regarding how their experiences with each other are mediated. Some
people want to share pictures of their dogs on Instagram while some people want
to see pictures of other people’s dogs, and Instagram has the incentive to make
this possible so everyone can be happy sharing and viewing each other’s dogs
(or, not).
But things can go off the rails quickly if companies feel pressured to achieve
continual and endless growth. They create systems that reward virality and the
most outrageous or venomous “hot takes” instead of the alleged purpose of
meaningful social interaction and social, emotional, and intellectual
nourishment. They optimize their algorithms and interfaces to reward our most
impulsive and petty reactions. Amplification of certain kinds of information—
combined with strategic roadblocks that make it difficult to report harmful
speech and hide from other users—leads to acute individual harms like
harassment as well as systemic harms like polarization, reduced ability to engage
in self-governance, negative public health outcomes, and chilling effects for
large groups of vulnerable people.170
A duty of loyalty cannot solve all the complex problems of content
moderation or harassment. As we have maintained, a duty of loyalty is merely
one important tool in a larger toolkit. But companies do have remarkable power
to influence how people using their systems interact with each other.171 They are
disloyal when they exert this power to optimize growth in ways that conflict with
the best interests of their customers. Subsidiary rules for loyal mediation are, of
course, complicated because of the potentially conflicting interests amongst
actors and those potentially adversely affected by the act. One trusting party
wants to speak while the others are made worse because of it. This is where our
proposed systemic focus and the traditional fiduciary law method of developing
a hierarchy of loyalties would help clarify lawmakers’ actions and firm’s
obligations.

170
See, e.g., DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 83–85 (2014) (explaining that
individuals who share the virtual harm they are receiving with law enforcement typically do not receive much
assistance).
171
See, e.g., id. at 66–68; HARTZOG, supra note 39, at 161–62.
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CONCLUSION
If, at this point, you are thinking that the conception of loyalty we have
articulated in this paper sounds quite different from traditional duties of loyalty,
you would be right. Traditional fiduciary models are ill-equipped to simply be
dropped onto online platforms. In her book Between Truth and Power, Julie
Cohen argues that legal changes that “simply adopt yesterday’s methods are
unlikely to succeed. Just as the most effective institutional changes of a previous
era engaged directly with the logistics of commodification and marketization, so
institutional changes for the current era will need to engage directly with the
logistics of dematerialization, datafication, and platformization.”172 The critics
of a duty of loyalty have correctly identified that the power of modern platforms
is unprecedented and will require multiple new approaches to disrupt it.
But the critiques that focus on the affordances and tools used by these
organizations also reveal a number of surprising virtues of data loyalty,
including its core, fundamental purpose: to limit the ability of one party in a
relationship to exploit the massive power advantage they have over the other for
self-gain. In this Article, we have tried to highlight those virtues to plot a new
vision for data loyalty, one that looks beyond individualistic approaches to
privacy to remedy systemic problems of power in relationships. This new vision
works to reinforce public governance efforts rather than serve as an alternative
to them. And it is capable of inspiring a public tired of being betrayed and
commodified to demand rules that compel loyal behavior and put their interests
first. Relational rules like data loyalty will not be sufficient, but they will be
necessary to mitigate the vulnerabilities within the information relationships that
will continue to be a part of our daily lives for the foreseeable future. Loyalty, it
turns out, can be a powerful state of mind for reenergizing privacy reform; it
embraces privacy’s relational turn, prioritizes human values, and offers solutions
that are flexible and clear, rather than vague and indeterminate. And while
loyalty, to be sure, will be only one piece of the puzzle of making the best of our
information revolution, it may just be the key piece that makes all the others
work.
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COHEN, supra note 4, at 270.

